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This thesis examines fishery-based conflicts (FBCs) and
the oceanic sovereignty implications of FBCs in a world
devoid of the East-West superpower rivalry. The argument
herein is that in the absence of the Cold War rivalry,
previously lower-priority economic and diplomatic issues
rise to the forefront of international relations. The
analysis suggests that political stability and naval
enforcement capability play a significant role in whether a
nation will commit its naval forces to defend its national
maritime claims. The Andean nations of Chile, Ecuador, and
Peru (CEP) are the subject of investigation because they
possess several attributes theorized to lead to future FBCs.
Recommendations are presented as a starting point in
formulating a two-fold strategy which will (1) minimize the
likelihood of FBCs, and (2) respect the sovereignty of South
American nations. Case studies of previous fishery-based
conflicts are examined to determine the validity of the
"Small Navy Theory". Also examined in this thesis are the
potential roles of the United States Navy and Coast Guard in
protecting US fishing interest and/or functioning as the
lead organizations for a UN-sponsored peacekeeping operation
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 1995, the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (UNFAO) reported that 70 percent of the world's
marine fish stocks have been fully exploited, over-
harvested, depleted or are recovering from previous
overfishing. At the same time, fish are the primary protein
source for many developed and developing nations. The
Institute of National Security Studies adds that coastal
states such as Canada, Argentina, Chile, and New Zealand
have often been at odds with fishermen who travel from more
distant countries (Spain, Portugal, Japan, and Russia) whose
citizens seek to fish these waters.
This thesis evaluates the causes of these fishery-based
conflicts (FBCs) and the implications of FBCs in a world
devoid of the East-West superpower rivalry. The argument
herein is that in the absence of the Cold War rivalry,
previously lower-priority economic and diplomatic issues
rise to the forefront of international relations. The
analysis suggests that political stability and naval
enforcement capability play a significant role in whether a
nation will commit its naval forces to defend its national
maritime claims.
The Andean nations of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru (CEP)
are the subject of investigation because they possess
IX
several attributes theorized to lead to future FBCs
:
developing economies highly dependent on export earnings
from marine resources; vast, fertile fishing areas within
their 200nm Exclusive Economic Zones; varying degrees of
political stability; and relatively comparable naval
missions and enforcement capabilities.
Recommendations are presented as a starting point in
formulating a two-fold strategy which will (1) protect the
ocean's biological environment/ and (2) respect the
sovereignty of South American nations.
Case studies of previous fishery-based conflicts are
examined to determine the causal factors that lead nations
to fight over biological marine resources and to test the
validity of Ken Booth' s concept of "Small Navies" in
predicting the outcomes of FBCs. Also examined in this
thesis are the potential roles of the United States Navy and
Coast Guard in protecting US fishing interest and/or
functioning as the lead organization for a UN-sponsored
peacekeeping operation in the waters of the southeastern
Pacific Ocean. Specifics include how the USN' s Third Fleet,
as Naval Component Commander (NAVFOR) , and the Coast Guard,
as Law Enforcement Component Commander (LAWFOR) , can




The author would like to acknowledge the financial
support of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) for
providing the research and travel funding used for this
thesis.
The author would like to thank the staff at Naval
Postgraduate School National Security Affairs Department
with special thanks to Ms. Marilyn Upshaw and Ms. Dora
Martinez for their invaluable assistance while the author
studied at NPS.
The author owes an enormous debt of gratitude to
Ambassador Rodney Kennedy-Minott and Professor Mary Callahan





• In December 1996, angry British fishermen who were
engaged in a row with their French rivals descended on
Westminster to express their frustration. This
incident followed an argument over disputed waters
around the Channel Islands where both British and
French fishermen claim a historic right to fish.
Passions reached a peak when seven French boats,
protected by a French coast guard vessel and
helicopter, entered the zone and fished. [Ref. 1]
• In March 1996, the United Kingdom deployed a destroyer
to the South Atlantic to protect UK fishing interests
from unlicensed fishermen. Argentina's foreign
minister protested the UK deployment and tensions
between the countries have increased over the fishing
issue. [Ref. 2]
• In November 1995, two Thai fishermen were killed by the
Malaysian Navy. The following month, the Malaysian
Navy seized and impounded three Thai trawlers while
passing through Malaysian-claimed waters. [Ref. 3]
• In 1968, five Soviet trawlers sighted 120 nautical
miles (nm) off the coast of Argentina and were tracked
by Argentine Air Force aircraft and reported to naval
units. In a coordinated pursuit Argentine warships
deployed 200nm from shore and captured two of the five
Soviet ships. One captured Soviet ship escaped from
armed escort about 25 nautical miles off the coast.
Argentine warplanes were vectored and opened fire on
the escaping Soviet vessel in international waters.
[Ref. 4:p. 80]
• In 1955, Ecuadorian President Jose Marie Velasco Ibarra
confronted the United States, opening what would later
become known as the "Tuna Wars." Ecuadorian naval
vessels seized two U.S. -flagged commercial fishing
boats and charged them with fishing inside the 200-
nautical-mile limit claimed by Ecuador as territorial
seas under its sovereignty. [Ref. 5:p. 35] Ecuadorian
actions provoked a U.S. embargo on tuna imports from
Ecuador.
These, and other, international incidents signal a
concern for governmental policy-makers, military leaders,
biologists, and economists in formulating new and accepted
guidelines for the sovereignty and management of the world's
oceans.
1 Accordingly, the concept of national security has
evolved from the traditional definition of protection of the
territorial integrity of the state and its vital national
interests to include issues that threaten the Earth's
ecological balance. Environmental protection and
sustainability have entered the realm of national security
affairs. The United Nations' Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS III) and the concept of oceanic sovereignty have
emerged as such international relations issues as nations
are preparing to enter the 21st century. Since 1995 the
U.S. Department of State has elevated environmental concerns
and issues to the forefront of diplomatic activities.
Concurrently, all the nation-states of the world are
realigning from alliance formed during the East-West
alignment of the Cold War. New and previously ignored
transnational and transboundary issues are moving to the
forefront of U.S. national security discussions.
Environmental damage that can affect American interests and
See Appendix B for a detailed summary of current fishery-based conflicts reported by the United
Nations' Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea.
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citizens represents such a new challenge to the field of
national security studies [Ref . 6:p. 6]
.
Without the constraints imposed by the West or the
former Soviet Bloc, nations are now on their own in defining
their sovereign boundaries and the extent to which they will
protect their territorial claims, whether they be land or
ocean areas. The uncertainty and potentially dangerous
consequences of this new alignment of nation-states entwined
with international environmental security problems were
discussed by the environmental scholar, Elena N. Nikitina.
Professor Nikitina posited that "As new states [of the
former Soviet Union] establish sovereignty over natural
resources and jurisdiction over conservation activities,
they will want to regulate their environmental independently
and establish their own environmental standards."
[Ref. 7:p. 259]
.
The environmentally independent and unipolar structure
of today' s international system encourages not only a quest
for resources but also a quest for territory. The desire
for more space has left the bounds of terra firma and
fostered an oceanic territorial race as a follow-on to the
colonial expansionism prevalent from the fifteenth through
nineteenth centuries. Motivation for this ocean territorial
race include the vast mineral and biological resources of
the ocean and their expected impact on the national
economies of developed and developing nations.
This thesis examines the implications of this oceanic
sovereignty controversy has for the international relations
of developing and developed nations. It remains a
formidable task for member-states of the United Nations to
enforce peacefully and build upon the 1982 Law of the Sea
Treaty while simultaneously protecting the sovereignty of
nation-states. Also, this study discusses possible
consequences of a UN-sponsored/ US Navy-led peacekeeping
operation centered on a fishery-based conflict (FBC) in the
southeastern Pacific Ocean.
The region of interest in this paper are the Andean
countries of Western South America; Chile, Ecuador, and
Peru. These three nations have played significant roles in
the development of the UNCLOS III and in other international
fisheries issues. The dependent variable under investigation
in this study is the likelihood of fishery-based
conflicts (FBCs) in the waters claimed by Chile, Ecuador, and
Peru.
The fishery-based conflicts examined include the "Tuna
Wars" of 1969 and 1971 between the United States, Peru and
Ecuador, respectively, and the 1972 "Cod War" between
Iceland and the United Kingdom. As the "Tuna Wars" have
demonstrated, the nations of western South America have
displayed controversial and nationalistic tendencies to
claim vast ocean areas.
Disputes over such ocean areas have the potential for
escalation. According to maritime and political scholar
Alfred Hu, at four times since World War II, disputes over
ownership of the ocean "have converted usually peaceful and
even romantic international fishing activity into bloody and
prolonged diplomatic and military confrontation."
[Ref . 8:p. 1]
.
To determine causal linkages that lead to such natural
resource-based military confrontations, domestic political
stability and naval enforcement capabilities of smaller,
regional navies need to be analyzed. However, the majority
of post-World War II naval theory and analysis has grown out
of the experiences of blue-water, global navies, which are
not applicable to the study of littoral, resource-based
maritime conflicts that have involved the navies of Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru. And, because the overwhelming majority
of national naval forces are "small navies", essentially
coast guards, Ken Booth's "Small Navy Theory" is applied to
the case studies of this thesis.
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the possible
implications for U. S. and South American regional security
that are posed by the bilateral disputes over the
possession, management, and exploitation of major oceanic
and coastal regions. Specifically, this study discusses
current debates, competing theories, and foreign policy
implications of oceanic sovereignty cause by the world
fishing crisis. 2 This crisis over a renewable natural
resource challenges international relations theorists and
national security analysts because such environmental-based
conflict place the rights and needs of individual nation-
states against the needs of the continental and global
communities
.
Professor Oran R. Young, in his book entitled
International Cooperation, posits, "Some natural resources
lie outside the bounds of national jurisdictions or cut
across existing jurisdictional boundaries in such a way that
effective management by individual states is not feasible".
Ref. 9:p 109] The principal problems of oceanic sovereignty
involve conflicting claims to mineral resources (actual and
In 1995, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) reported that 70 percent of
the world's marine fish stocks have been fully exploited, over-harvested, depleted or are recovering from
previous overfishing. These fish are the primary protein source for many developed and developing
nations. So-called "coastal states" such as Canada, Argentina, Chile, and New Zealand have often been at
odds with fishermen who travel from more distant countries (Spain, Portugal, Japan, and Russia) whose
citizens seek to fish these waters. From the Institute for National Security Studies' Strategic Assessment
1995, U.S. Air Force Academy.
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estimated offshore oil fields) and biological resources
(fisheries) in disputed waters.
To avoid conflict over a natural resource that is
transboundary, such as migratory fish species, supranational
organizations have been suggested to hold the most promise.
However, supranational institutions, such as the United
Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS) , or the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) , have little
or no concrete enforcement capabilities and may not be
appropriately staffed, funded, or trained to address the
particular ecological issue.
Young concludes that "supranational institutions in the
form of a comprehensive global regime are not a preferred
option for the management of the world's marine fisheries."
[Ref. 10:p. 121]. He suggests that the main international
relations dilemma in environmental security issues is that
the management of living resources requires a high degree of
international cooperation and a willingness on the part of
nations to agree to some forms of international control and
abdicate some of their authority over resources within their
boundaries. Ocean fisheries, which should be perpetually
sustainable resources, have now become threatened world
commodities, subject to devastating collapse and resulting
economic hardships.
According to the Times Atlas of the Oceans:
Few nations, however, have shown a willingness to
forego any of their sovereign rights or to cede authority
over their affairs to international bodies. International
laws and regulations remain, for the most part, gentlemen's
agreements among nations. A country can and often does
encourage commercial entities to ignore international law
when it is economically advantageous for it to do so. Only
international public opinion or, more rarely, the threat of
force by one nation or by a group of nations can serve as an
effective deterrent in compelling a country to stop
sponsoring certain activities that are endangering a
resource. [Ref. ll:p. 186]
Specifically, this thesis proposes that the degree of
political stability or instability existing within a nation
can be shown to have played a role in the initiation of
fishery-based conflicts. This study asks if such domestic
political stability or instability is present in Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru and whether their naval enforcement
capabilities are sufficient to protect their national
maritime interests.
An important point must be made in respect to the
analysis of international issues in the Latin American
world. The term Latin America is often used in scholarly
literature without due regard to the political, social, and
economic differences that exist among the hemisphere's
Spanish-speaking nations.
This thesis evaluates only characteristics of Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru and acknowledges that while the variables
herein may be applied to an analysis of other Latin American
8
nations, the assumption is NOT made that ail other Spanish-
speaking states will have identical reactions to foreign
intrusion of their claimed territorial waters. For the
countries of Latin America, oceanic sovereignty issues
differ not only on the particular region of Latin America,
i.e. Central America, the Andean nations, or The Southern
Cone, but also differ within each individual nation.
B. RELEVANCE
The question of ownership of the fishery resources of
the world oceans has caused significant military
confrontation throughout the world and for as long as
humankind has put to sea. 3 Coastal nations of every
economic development level have created naval forces to
defend their claims to marine resources. Currently, to
prevent economic losses and preempt armed conflict, the
United States Coast Guard monitors continually the fishery
resources of both U.S. coasts, the Gulf of Mexico, and the
South Pacific.
Within the South American context, this disputed
ownership of the biological and mineral resources of the
3 James Wang, Handbook on Ocean Politics and Law, page 41. The very first idea of the sea as common
property for all to use had its origin in the juridical writings of Marcianus. In the second century, the
Roman jurist advance the proposition that the sea was communis omnium naturali jure, or common to all
as part of natural law. By the sixth century the concept was codified in Roman law. While the Roman
Empire accepted the legal status of the sea as common property for all, nonetheless it declared in the
"Theory of Glassators" that it exercised effective control, but not outright ownership, over the
Mediterranean Sea. This exercise ofRoman jurisdiction of the adjacent sea was made for two purposes: to
extend Caesar's power into the sea and to suppress piracy.
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waters of the South American continent remains a highly
contentious issue. Countries with robust commercial fishing
fleets that operate far from their own territorial waters,
reject Chile, Ecuador, and Peru's expansion (from 12
nautical miles 200 nautical miles) of the UNCLOS III concept
of territorial waters.
The Times Atlas of the Oceans accurately describes the
results of this expansionism stating, "As a result of
greater determination to claim sea areas and ocean
resources, more states have been developing modern,
versatile and ^appropriate' levels of naval forces capable
of defending their perceived rights and asserting claims in
near and distant waters." [Ref. 12 :p. 186] Therefore, the
different perceptions and legal interpretations of the
territorial waters concept cause the developed *North'
countries and underdeveloped ^South' countries to be at
odds
.
Unlimited pursuit of national and commercial interests
from both the ^North' and ^South' has resulted in the
exploitation of the marine resources past its sustainable
production levels, i.e. the vanishing of the California
sardine fishery and the destruction of the cod fishery of
the Grand Banks serve as examples of such exploitation. 4
In the 1930s, overfishing of the waters of northern California led to a total collapse of the sardine
fishery. More recently, overfishing by commercial fleets from various nations has led to the destruction of
the cod fishery off the eastern coast of Canada. This destruction of marine resouces has caused severe
10
C. IMPACT TO DEVELOPING NATIONS
For Latin American nations, protecting their maritime
interests while abiding by international regulation
represents a special challenge. If faced with the naval
military forces of the xNorth' , can Chile, Ecuador, and Peru
adequately protect their commercial fishing fleets and
claimed waters? Can the loss of revenue and protein sources
for developing nations be. overcome by other economic
activities or food production? If distant-water fishing
fleets exhaust the renewable fishery resources of the
southeastern Pacific Ocean, what can or should be done by
the governments of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru?
These questions place Chile, Ecuador, and Peru squarely
opposite the majority of the member-states of the United
Nations and the other signatories to the UN Law of the Sea.
These three Andean nations, as custodians of the greatest
fisheries of the world, must enforce abide by their own
resource management plans and objectives in order to protect
their national economies and the fisheries of the
southeastern Pacific Ocean. Therefore, fishing, and more
accurately x overfishing' , of the high seas will continue to
challenge such nations of the ^South' and contribute to the
proliferation of future fishery-based conflicts.
economic hardships for Canadian fishernmen and prompted the Canadian government to seek expansion
of their territorial water claim past 200 nautical miles.
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Contrary to the East-West rivalry of the Cold War,
resource-based disputes can foster a North-South rivalry.
In such a rivalry, the acknowledgment that natural resources
are not infinitely available has led to international
conflict over the management and use of these resources.
These environmental issues, once conveniently put aside
in favor of political survival concerns, have emerged as a
preeminent threat to nation' s economic development and the
Earth's long-term capacity to sustain human life.
The 1991 Persian Gulf War clearly illustrated that
manipulation of natural resources, in this case the Iraqi's
desire to control Persian Gulf oil production, can lead to
world condemnation and armed conflict.
Although not as critical to world industrial survival
as the free market flow of oil, fishery conflicts have more
of an impact to the developing nations because for a number
of nations, fisheries constitute either a major source of
animal protein or source of export earnings. Fisheries are
a potential source of food for a large number of developing
nations with rapidly growing populations. 5 Peter Weber
writes in The State of the World 1995 that "Worldwide, fish
and other products of the sea account for 16% of the animal
UNFAO, Marine Fisheries, at approximately 70 million and 52 million tons per year, respectively, beef
and pork production are second and third to marine fish production of 80 million tons per year, from
Lester Brown et al., Vital Signs 1993, WW. Norton & Company, 1993.
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protein consumed, more than either beef or pork, and for
5.6% of total protein intake [Ref. 13:p. 21].
Lastly, the relevance of studying oceanic sovereignty
is that the lessons learned in examining the causes of
environment-based conflicts may be lead to national and
international strategies that protect natural resources and
prevent direct military confrontation. Without such
strategies, there is a high probability that the U.S. Navy
or Coast Guard can be drawn into regional fishery-based
conflicts in a protective role or as the lead in a UN
peacekeeping mission. To support such a UN mission, the
U.S. Intelligence Community must be aware of current oceanic
sovereignty issues and concepts. Intelligence analysts must
increase their regional expertise and Law of the Sea
knowledge base in order to effectively satisfy the
intelligence requirements of naval forces engaged in FBCs or
other resource-based naval conflicts.
D. DEFINITIONS
What is oceanic sovereignty? In the absence of a
universally accepted, all-encompassing definition, oceanic
sovereignty can be said to be the protection, management,
and use of oceanic resources to benefit the national economy
and provide for the general well-being of the nation's
population. However, oceanic sovereignty is an
13
international and not solely a national security issue.
Professor Peter J. Taylor, using a quote from I.
Wallerstein, wrote, "Sovereignty is never a matter for a
single state; it is an inter-state arrangement ... [that] can
exist only 'for states who reciprocally recognize each
other's legitimate existence within the framework and norms
of the inter-state system'" [Ref. 14:p. 159]. This
international focus of oceanic sovereignty is in contrast to
traditional national security issues, such as invasion from
foreign forces, and can lead to ecological degradation,
economic instability, and conflicts.
Other key concepts relating to the oceanic sovereignty
debate include:
1. Political Stability
In simplest terms, this concept refers to the ability
of a nation's political institutions to maintain order,
protect the lives of its citizens and health of its economy,
create and enforce laws, and perform non-violent transfers
of power. Political stability can be defined using a wide
range of factors including: number of years since
independence; number of administrations since independence;
duration of current administration; the existence of a loyal
opposition; civilian control over the military; the
14
existence and influence of anti-state guerrilla groups; and
the condition of the national economy.
Based on these factors, the United States can be said
to be in the group of nations exhibiting the highest degree
of political stability while nations such as Cambodia
(Kampuchea) exemplify those nations with the lowest degree
of political stability. Latin American nations generally
fall somewhere between these two extreme measures of
political stability.
2. National Maritime Claims
This concept involves the determination that certain
areas of the ocean are the sovereign property of a
particular nation-state and that naval deployments will be
conducted to protect maritime claims. These bounded areas,
according to Peter J. Taylor, have become a geo-political
necessity of today's world-economy because "a world of
sovereign states is a world of boundaries" [Ref. 15:p. 164],
Examples of non-traditional naval missions in support
of boundary determination and sustainment include fishery
and EEZ protection, sea lanes of communication (SLOC)
protection, maintenance of access to Antarctica, and coastal
defense.
Jonathan Bartlett, in his edited volume The Ocean
Environment, presents the four principal national maritime
15
claims of oceanic sovereignty as disputes over territorial
seas and strategic straits, over the biological resources of
the oceans, over the seabed and subsoil mineral riches, and
over marine pollution. [Ref. 16:p. 165]
3. Naval Enforcement Capability
Naval enforcement capability is composed of five
characteristics that can illustrate a nation' s ability to
defend its national maritime claims. The traits are;
Gross tonnage of ships in inventory
Types of ships and weapons systems
Training and proficiency of crews
Political will to deploy naval forces
Defense budgetary limitations
The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral
Felix N. Gromov, explained the concept of naval enforcement
capability for his country as the ability to "back up"
Russian interests in vital regions of the world oceans. 6
4 . Coastal States
Coastal states are those developed or developing
nations that are located adjacent to ocean areas and claim
territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. Coastal
6 Naval Forces Magazine interviewed the Commander-in Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Felix N.
Gromov. When asked for his vision of the roles and missions of the Russian Navy he replied, "...[the]
Russian Navy, just like the naval forces of major world powers, is engaged to handle other critical tasks to
support the national interests. They include: backing up Russian interests in vital regions; defending the
country's sovereignty and territorial integrity, surveillance and patrol of the EEZ and related airspace;
securing commercial activities such as shipping, fishing, trade, minerals, and other economic projects..."
Naval Forces Magazine Volume X, No. HI/1996, p 15.
16
states play an integral role in oceanic sovereignty because
as marine resources have become less abundant and more
valuable, these states have sought to control the resources
through expanding maritime boundaries.
According to the UNCLOS III, such coastal states are
directed to manage their fishery resources according to the
norm of maximum sustainable yield. The non-living resources
of the continental shelf are to be managed by the coastal
state with due regard to consequences for the environment.
5. Maritime Powers
Maritime powers are those nations possessing a naval
capability to protect their national maritime claims and
enforce treaty conditions, i.e. the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Russia. The definition of maritime
power also includes those nations that derive significant
economic power from the production of their local and
distant-water fishing fleets, i.e. the United States, Japan,
South Korea, and Russia.
6. Fishery-Based Conflicts (FBCs)
For the purpose of this study, fishery-based conflicts
are defined as active conflicts between at least two nations
over the access to biological marine resources, amounts of
fish harvested, or methods of fishing employed. The species
17
involved can include pelagic as well as sedentary organisms.
An FBC can be of three levels of seriousness;
Low: minor diplomatic protests and no
subsequent military actions;
- Medium: moderate diplomatic conflict with or
without actual or implied military actions;
High: intense diplomatic actions culminating
in military actions or economic embargoes.
7. Law of the Sea Treaty. 7
The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention of 1982
(UNCLOS III) is the international agreement that came as a
result of negotiations from 1973 to 1982. UNCLOS III was
the third attempt at an acceptable multilateral framework
for protecting the ocean environment and properly managing
the sea's biological and mineral resources. Significant to
discussions of international relations issues and in the
words of maritime scholar James C.F. Wang, "the UNCLOS III
provided, for the first time in human history, a
comprehensive legal framework for all uses of the oceans."
[Ref. 17:p. 36]
UNFAO Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. The United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica. This marked
the culmination of more than 14 years of negotiations involving the participation by more than 150
countries representing all regions of the world, all legal and political systems and the spectrum of
socio/economic development. The Convention, which entered into force on 16 November 1994, embodies
and enshrines the notion that all problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be addressed
as a whole. On 16 November 1993, Guyana became the 60th State to ratify the UN Law of the Sea
Convention (UNCLOS).Today, it is the globally recognized regime dealing with all matters relating to the
law of the sea. INTERNET, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/losconvl.htm, January 1997.
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The principal provision of the UNCLOS III was the
extent of jurisdiction that states may exercise offshore: a
territorial sea of 12nm (with a contiguous zone of an
additional 12nm for customs, fiscal, immigration and
sanitary regulation) ; coastal state jurisdiction over
resources in an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200nm; and
coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf in
cases where it extends beyond the EEZ.
8. Migratory Fisheries
Migratory fisheries represent an especially contentious
issue in the debate over sovereignty of ocean resources. By
definition, migratory fisheries are those in which the
aquatic species spawn within recognized territorial
boundaries then travel to international waters during the
course of their lifetime. The Salmonids of the U.S. Pacific
northwest are an example of the difficulty migratory
fisheries pose in the Law of the Sea debate. The salmon
spawn in rivers within the sovereign inland territory of the
United States and as such, the fish are considered by the
U.S. Government to be property of the United States or
American ^citizens.' However, since during the salmon's
maturation, they consume the resources of the international
high seas, many countries, notably, Japan and Russia,
consider the species international property, subject to
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capture by any nation. 8 Oran Young states, ""Many stocks of
fish and other oceanic resources, such as marine mammals or
oceanic birds, range over extensive areas without regard for
the jurisdictional boundaries of sovereign states."
[Ref . 18:p. 109]
.
Anticipating this difficulty with the migratory nature
of living resources, the UNCLOS III relies on regional
fishing organizations to address conservation and management
details. Where difficulties over straddling stocks and high
seas fisheries arise, disputes are supposed to be settled by
negotiation and arbitration, thus avoiding direct military
conflict.
9. Territorial Waters
Territorial waters are deemed to be the sovereign
property of the state, similar to the land areas within its
accepted international boundaries. Therefore, nations are
thought to have the inalienable right to defend their
territory from invasion or exploitation by foreign forces.
Article Three of the UNCLOS III Convention states,
"Every state has the right to establish the breadth of its
territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12nm, measured
from the baselines determined in accordance with this
International law provides several opposing doctrines relating to property rights over international
waters: the doctrines of unlimited territorial integrity, equitable and reasonable use, and unlimited
territorial sovereignty. However, the fact remains that the strongest and most advantageously positioned
countries can claim and use the resource with little concern for the impacts on others.
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Convention."' This territorial waters provision of the
UNCLOS III has serious implications to international
relations, national security, and naval operations because
the 12nm line overlaps more than 135 international straits.
The territorial waters provisions of the UNCLOS III
increased the political and economic power and influence of
the world's coastal states but caused initially a furor
among the industrialized nations that had ocean-going naval
capabilities. These major naval powers were appeased when
the UNCLOS III territorial waters doctrine was tempered with
the concepts of innocent passage and freedom of navigation.
10. Contiguous Zone
A contiguous zone is a 12nm belt of water adjacent to,
but extending seaward beyond, the territorial sea; in this
zone the coastal state exercises a certain special
jurisdiction for the enforcement of customs, immigration and
health laws. It has also been the practice of coastal
states to declare such a contiguous zone for defense and
security purposes.
11. Continental Margin
In his comprehensive volume entitled Handbook on Ocean
Politics and Law, James C.F. Wang defines the continental
margin as that portion of the solid earth's surface adjacent
to land, but underlying a coastal plain that extends
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seaward. Generally consisting of a shelf, a slope and a
rise, the continental margin gently slopes seaward from the
tide water to a depth of 150-200 meters. [Ref. 19:p. 9-10]
12. Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ)
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and
adjacent to the territorial sea extending out to 200nm
wherein the coastal state has exclusive rights to exploit
the biological and mineral resources of the seas. Figure 1
graphically depicts the relationships and limitations of the































Figure 1. Legal Regimes of Ocean Areas [Ref. 20 :p. 12]
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13. Hot Pursuit
The customary rule in international law known as "hot
pursuit" refers to the right of a coastal state to apprehend
a foreign vessel that is believed to have committed a crime
within its territorial waters. The right of hot pursuit
ceases once the suspect vessel enters the territorial waters
of another state. [Ref. 21 :p. 79]
14 . Innocent Passage
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea states that all
states have the right to "innocent passage" of another
states' territorial waters provided the passage is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the
coastal state. [Ref. 22 :p. 81] Within this definition, the
free access to international shipping lanes provides the
world community with price stability and for example, ships
passing from Japan to the Middle East that were unable to
pass through international straits controlled by Indonesia
would be forced to re-route around Australia, adding 5,800
nautical miles and 15 days (assuming a speed of 15 knots) to
their journey. [Ref. 23: INTERNET]
The oceanic sovereignty perceptions of the lesser-
developed coastal states is often contrary to the position
of maritime powers and their concern for "freedom of
navigation". In his doctoral dissertation on fishery
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conflicts and national policy-making, Alfred Hu states that
"...To most coastal states, the most tangible and valuable
assets in the seas are the living and non-living natural
resources the seas contain, rather than the intangible
'freedom' of the high seas." [Ref. 24:p. 49].
However, to the United States, the concept of 'freedom
of the seas' and innocent passage remains a vital national
security priority. Since 1979, U.S. military ships and
aircraft have asserted navigational rights against excessive
claims of more than thirty-five countries, at the rate of
thirty to forty per year. The most well-known of these
operations was the 1986 challenge to Libya's claims to the
Gulf of Sidra. The U.S. Defense Department has been a
supporter of provisions of the Law of the Sea prior to its
official inception. In 1994, U.S. Secretary of Defense,
William Perry summarized the U.S. position stating, "We
support the Convention [UNCLOS III] because it confirms
traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight;
it details rights through international straits; and it
reduces prospects for disagreements with coastal states
during operations." [Ref. 25: INTERNET]
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15. Non-Traditional Missions (NTMs)
For the purposes of this thesis, non-traditional
missions are defined those military operations that are not
classified as traditional uses of a global navy, e.g. strike
warfare, power projection, or deterrence. Examples of NTMs
include fishery patrols/protection, drug enforcement
operations, refugee management, pollution control, and
disaster relief. Disputes and conflicts occurring in the
waters surrounding the South American continent represent
examples of non-traditional naval missions involving
overlapping EEZs, traditional fishing claims, offshore
mineral rights, and claims of national jurisdiction and
rights.
The U.S. Naval Intelligence Community leadership has
recognized the emergence of NTMs, including fisheries
monitoring, and provided direction for intelligence
professional in "supporting a wider range of national
concerns." [Ref. 26:pp. 14-16]
E. SUMMARY
This chapter introduced the purpose and relevance of
oceanic sovereignty and presented the key concepts involved
in the dispute over ocean access and biological resources.
International treaties and cooperation, arguably ineffective
in conflict avoidance, have been proposed as the best means
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for protecting the sovereign rights of nations and
simultaneously maintaining the sustainability of the world's
oceans
.
Awareness of these key oceanic sovereignty concepts is
needed within the U.S. Navy and, more specifically, the U.S.
Naval Intelligence Community since both organizations will
be substantially involved in fishery-based conflicts and/or
UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions. United Nations missions
of environmental protection and monitoring, such as
enforcing the UN's moratorium on the use of driftnets, are
current examples that prove that military assets will
continue to be used as tools for environmental salvation.
[Ref. 27:p. 16]
Further discussion of oceanic sovereignty issues,
including historical and technological background of the
world's fishing crisis, is essential for future naval




II. HISTORICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
The history of the Law of the Sea is a continuing story
of armed conflict and diplomatic tensions. This perennial
conflict pits coastal states seeking to exercise
jurisdiction over ocean waters off their shores against
other states seeking to exercise freedoms of navigation,
fishing, and other common interests in the ocean.
[Ref. 28:p. 3]
This chapter will present key developments in the
history of the Law of the Sea and provide scientific and
technological data on the fishery production of Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru. It is argued that historic legal
developments, created in 15th century Western Europe, and
naturally-occurring scientific phenomena (with its
associated economic importance to fishery production) have
caused oceanic sovereignty to be such a complex issue for
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.
A. HISTORY
Oceanic sovereignty issues of the modern era date back
to 1494 when the nations of Spain and Portugal created the
Treaty of Tordesillas, effectively dividing the known world
between the two monarchies. Challenges to the treaty
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initially came from the nations of northern Europe and led
to centuries of diplomatic conflict and naval engagements.
The shrinking of these expansive claims began with the
great juridical debates about Mare Liberum (open sea) and
Mare Clausum (closed sea) that occurred in the early 17th
century. The most influential voice in these debates was
that of the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius. In 1609, Grotius
published his opinions on Mare Librium in which he argued
for the right of the Dutch to trade in the East Indies.
This ignited a international conflict since the Portuguese
claimed a monopoly on the right of trade and navigation of
the East Indies flowing from the Papal Bull and Treaty of
Tordesillas [Ref. 29: pp. 3-5], As Grotius stated, "[the
ocean] can neither be seized nor enclosed. .
.
[because the
ocean] rather possesses the earth than is possessed by it."
[Ref. 30:p. 167]
.
The importance of ownership of the oceans expanded
greatly during the 18th and 19th centuries. The rise of
imperialism and colonization led the nations of Europe and
the United States to place increased emphasis on creating
and maintaining a powerful navy, able to travel to and
secure ocean areas far removed from their native shores.
This period also witnessed an explosion of seaborne
commerce, which dictated economic development, and an ever-
28
expanding desire to control the seas, which determined
wartime superiority. Coast guards and navies became highly
visible instruments of maritime enforcement and diplomatic
negotiation.
For the United States, the oceans have always been tied
to U.S. national security and defense. Initially, the
oceans were a buffer from the military power and the
conflicts of European nations. With the development of U.S.
naval capabilities in the late nineteenth century and the
subsequent results of the Spanish-American War, the United
States used the oceans to project power to distant
countries. [Ref. 31: INTERNET]
The Spanish-American War of 1898 marked a new beginning
for the concept of oceanic sovereignty and the importance of
controlling the seas. To protect from foreign naval
aggression and to protect marine resources, coastal states
held a succession of international conferences which
addressed the issue of the extent of oceanic claims. In
1930, the international debates focused on whether the
territorial sea should be three or four miles.
However, weapons developments and tactics of
World War II changed fundamentally the debate on territorial
seas by expanding the distance from the coast that a
sovereign state considered necessary for national security.
Six nautical miles was no longer considered acceptable since
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missile and naval gunfire ranges far exceeded that distance.
Nations sought protection for their shores through
constitutional amendments and national laws that extended
their territorial waters and control of the seas.
James Wang, in his book The Handbook on Ocean Politics
and Law, considered the single most significant event that
affected both the direction and scope of the Law of the Sea
in the aftermath of World War II to be President Harry S.
Truman's 1945 proclamation on U.S. maritime interests. [Ref.
32:p. 25] The Truman declaration, which extended the U.S.
territorial claim to the continental margin existing under
adjacent seas out to 200nm, set a negative precedent in the
debate over who owns the seas. In addition to national
security concerns, this declaration was initiated to protect
the rights of the United States to exploit offshore mineral
and energy resources. A spate of similar declarations from
Latin American nations immediately followed that of
President Truman. 9
Alfred Hu concluded that President Truman's actions led
to a domino effect in oceanic sovereignty claims, especially
in Latin America. Hu stated, "In order to protect its own
sea resources and to ^follow' the precedent established by
the United States .. .Chile was the first state to make the
See Appendix C for a synopsis of Latin American responses to President Truman's maritime
declaration.
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unilateral claim to a 200nm zone for fisheries..." [Ref.
33:p. 23]." The Truman Proclamation was consistent with
Hu' s belief that great powers often tend to place
international law in the context of their own national
interests and subject to their own interpretations.
However, other coastal nations interpreted oceanic
sovereignty rights quite differently than the maritime
powers that possessed substantial distant-water fishing
fleets. To protect their perceived oceanic sovereign
rights, the Andean nations of Ecuador, and Peru joined Chile
and signed the Declaration of Santiago in 1952, extending
their territorial waters out to 200 nautical miles.
In 1948, Nicaragua and Costa Rica followed suit with
these Latin American nations staking their claims to the
seas. Nicaragua added a constitutional provision and Costa
Rica enacted a national law that provided for expanding
their claims to oceanic territory and resources.
This series of declarations and constitutional
amendments illustrated the presence and, to some extent,
nationalistic tendencies prevalent throughout the Western
Hemisphere. Adding credibility to their words, the
governments of Peru and Ecuador engaged U.S. commercial
fishing fleets in 1955, 1969, and 1971 when those fleets
were perceived as violating the territorial integrity of
these South American nations. Other noteworthy fishery-
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based conflicts occurring after World War II include: the
1971 "Cod Wars," a series of naval disputes between Iceland
and the United Kingdom in the North Atlantic; the 1986 Sino-
Argentine "Squid War" in the South Atlantic; and numerous
FBCs of the South China Sea between China, the Philippines,
Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand.
History has thus shown that nation-states will engage
in armed conflict to protect against incursions into their
claimed territorial waters. Since the conclusion of World
War II, such conflicts over ocean areas have averaged about
five per year as nations realize the importance of marine
resources and seek to enforce their oceanic sovereignty
claims [Ref. 34:p. 186]. It is paramount for U.S. naval
leadership and intelligence personnel to be aware of this
phenomenon of oceanic sovereignty, and more specifically
* fights over fish,' since future naval operations may
originate from such disputes over ocean area ownership.
B. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS
The most important species of biological marine
resources for food and revenue are tuna, salmon, sardine,
shrimp, lobster, and crab [Ref. 35:p. 58] . With the
exception of tuna and salmon, most of these commercially
viable fish species are found within 200 miles of coastal
landmasses. The implications of this natural phenomena is
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exaggerated in the case of those nations, including Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru, that claim sovereign ownership of the
ocean out to 200nm. The 200nm territorial sea declarations
of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru are in direct conflict with the
provisions of the UNCLOS III, which allots only 12nm of
territorial waters to each coastal nation. For these three
nations, however, the economic bounty of the sea is viewed
overwhelmingly in terms of marine resources and not mineral
wealth. To this end, the governments of Chile, Ecuador, and
Peru defend their oceanic sovereignty claims by stating that
other nations, possessors of more substantial continental
shelves, have the option of mineral exploitation of the sea
whereas they do not. These governments view ownership of
marine resources, out to 200nm, as compensatory because of
their lack of mineral wealth capability. However, all the
world' s maritime powers disagree with this logic and cite
the UNCLOS III in their opposition. The maritime powers
reason that if all nations sought similar 200nm territorial
waters, then international seaborne trade would be
restricted, and thus the world economy would become
unstable. This dichotomy of views on an international basis
leads to the incontestable prediction that fishery-based
conflicts will reoccur.
Technologically, the importance of Latin American
nations in the study of fishery-based conflicts stems from
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the oceanic phenomenon called ^coastal upwellings.'
Professor Matthias Tomczak and scientist J. Stuart Godfrey
explain, "Coastal upwelling systems are among the most
important fishing regions of the world oceans because they
offer optimum conditions for the production of the foods
necessary for fish reproduction and growth. " [Ref. 36 :p.
144]
Many commercially viable fish, not including migratory
species such as tuna, concentrate in coastal areas because
of this presence of feed organisms and desirable water
temperatures caused by these coastal upwellings. Due to the
periodic phenomena of coastal upwellings, the waters of
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru represent the most productive and
lucrative fishing areas of the world [Ref. 37:p. 144]. The
impact of the Peruvian coastal upwelling was confirmed in
the UN Food and Agriculture report entitled Global Fishery
Production in 1994. This report stated, "The production
increase in marine waters [7.3 million mt from 1993-94] was
due almost entirely to higher capture fishery yields which
were up 4 . 9 million mt, mainly attributed to anchoveta
catches by Peru and Chile..." [Ref. 38 : INTERNET]
.
An additional technological factor surrounding marine
resource production is the conclusion of leading scientists
that 90 percent of the ocean's living resources are to be
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found on the continental shelf [Ref. 39:p. 12]. The
extremely narrow continental shelves off Chile, Ecuador, and
Peru, cause the vast fishery resources of their territorial
waters to be concentrated close to the shoreline, creating a
productive and lucrative fishery industry. The combination
of narrow continental shelves and coastal upwellings has
produced the most fertile areas for living resources in the
world's oceans.
However, the coastal upwelling areas of the oceans,
depicted in Figure 2, are not evenly distributed. This
natural inequity induces conflict between major
industrialized nations and developing nations. The maritime
powers, with distant-water fishing fleets and large
populations to feed, intrude upon the developing coastal
states of Africa and South America (Chile, Ecuador, and
Peru) which have coastal upwelling naturally occurring
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Figure 2 . Ocean Currents and Upwellings During the Northern
Winter. [Ref. 40:p. 58]
The UN's Food and Agriculture Organization reported in
its State of Food and Agriculture 1992 that the fertility of
these coastal areas caused a "redistribution of the seas'
wealth . . . with a few coastal states gaining large benefits
and a few distant-water fishing states incurring large
losses." The UNFAO added that technical developments
allowed for the rapid growth in distant water fishing
capabilities of industrialized nations. [Ref. 41: INTERNET]
Of these developments, the proliferation of huge factory
36
ships, pictured in Figure 3, capable of processing the
catches of fishermen while still at sea, contributed greatly
to the over-exploitation of several of the world's most
productive fisheries. These gargantuan vessels also
increased tensions between coastal states and the maritime
nations to which they belonged. [Ref. 42: INTERNET]





With a coastline of 4,022 miles and a population of
13.7 million, Chile depends heavily on revenue and
employment from the fishery industry. Hence, the Chilean
government considers protection and management of its ocean
resources a vital national priority.
According to World Bank statistics, the Chilean
population depended on fishery products for approximately
7.8% of their total daily protein requirements [Ref. 44 :p.
169] . The importance of the ocean resources to the Chilean
economy is illustrated in the 1992 assessment that Chile
derived over $1.1 billion from the export of fishery
products [Ref. 45:p. 357]
.
Further, the UNFAO 1994 Global Fishery Production
report stated that the global production increase of fishery
products in 1993, up 4.9 million metric tons from 1992, was
mainly attributable to higher anchoveta catches by Peru and
Chile. [Ref. 46: INTERNET]
2. Ecuadorian Fishery
Ecuador's fishery industry, specifically its shrimp
industry, is one of the most robust most volatile in the
world. The economic bounty of this industry for Ecuador
accounts for over $500 million of export earning annually
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and represents 16% of the Ecuadorian Gross Domestic Product
[Ref. 47 : INTERNET]
.
Marine resources, both mineral and biological, have
always had significant political and economical implications
for the Ecuadorian people. In addition to fisheries, the
exploitation of ocean areas for oil production is vital to
the Ecuadorian economy.
3. Peruvian Fishery
The ocean areas of southeastern Pacific represent an
vital economic environment for the Peruvian government.
Vast shoals of anchovy, tuna, and several varieties of other
valued fish are present in these waters making it one of the
world's richest commercial fisheries. The Peru/Chile
coastal upwelling system led to Peru's 1993 fishmeal
production of 1.6 million metric tons, reestablishing Peru
as the world's largest producer [Ref. 48:p. 160].
The natural volatility of fisheries adds to the
complexity fishery revenues play in the Peruvian economy.
The Peruvian government must remain diligent in protecting
the health of their ocean areas to prevent another near-
total collapse of the lucrative anchoveta fishery (shown in
Figure 4) . Despite the vast resources of the southeastern
Pacific, human greed managed to destroy the basis of what
before 1973 was the largest fishery in the world.
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Overfishing and natural variability of the upwelling
environment cause by the El Nino 10 weather phenomenon
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Figure 4. The Collapse of the Peruvian Anchoveta Fishery.
[Ref. 50:p. 99]
The administration of current Peruvian President
Alberto Fujimori is acutely aware of the economic
difficulties they will face if ocean resources are exploited
to previous levels. Therefore, protection of their
"territorial seas" remain a vital national security issue.
C. SUMMARY
Historical and scientific information only serves as a
basis for analyzing the oceanic stakes that induce nations
to fight over oceanic resources. The annals of seaborne
10 The El Nino weather phenomena occurs irregularly, wanning the water flow in the Peruvian Current,
greatly reducing the production of feed for commercially viable fish species, rising the surface
temperatures, and causing severe rainfall.
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trade have shown that nations will defend militarily their
national economy and prestige. The technical points
surrounding oceanic sovereignty clarify the value of marine
resources to humanity in monetary, environmental, and
nutritional terms.
To take a discussion deeper, theory and hypotheses must
be presented and tested. If political stability and naval
enforcement capability play a role in determining the
likelihood of fishery-based conflict, then these two factors
can be the basis of new international relations theory.
Development of hypothesis statements concerning
environmental-based conflicts assist in developing national
strategies to avoid lethal naval engagements.
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III. HYPOTHESES AND THEORY
As the previous historical descriptions show, the
nations of South America greatly value the oceanic resources
and those adjacent to their coasts. However, historical
descriptions of the value of and tensions over oceanic
resources do not explain when and why conflicts erupt and
therefore, theory must be presented and analyzed.
A. PUZZLE
The major research questions this thesis seeks to
answer are:
1. Will over-exploitation of ocean resources cause an
international or intra-regional conflict involving Chile,
Ecuador, and/or Peru?
2. Does a nation's degree of political stability have
a role in determining whether fishery-based conflicts will
(re) occur? Will political instability cause the Chilean,
Ecuadorian, Peruvian governments to deploy their naval
forces against other nations?
3. Are the naval forces of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru
proficient enough to accomplish their missions of defending




Using the case study method of comparative research,
this thesis posits that these questions of oceanic
sovereignty have widespread implications to the global
fishing crisis and the 21st century international relations
of western South America. These case studies and an
analysis of raw economic and political data help to
determine the applicability of the "Small Navy Theory".
More specifically, the dependent variable in this paper
is 'the likelihood of fishery-based conflicts' with the
independent variables being:
1. The degree of political stability present in Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru; and
2. The capability of Chilean, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian
navies to enforce their national maritime claims and the
provisions of their 1952 Declaration of Santiago.
C. CURRENT DEBATES
Before the competing theories of oceanic sovereignty
are presented, the current debates raging among the
different international actors involved in global resources
management must be understood. These debates generally are
categorized as either international ( 'North-South' ) or




1 . International Conflicts
In the international debate over global resources, the
developed countries of the xNorth' stress that protection of
the global environment benefits all humankind. The
governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of the
North encourage energy conservation, limits on population
growth, and recycling of waste as means to make the world
"greener". Through domestic tax provisions, foreign debt-
for-nature exchanges, and sometimes implied uses of force,
the North attempts to sway the debate. However, the North
in general and the United States specifically are faced with
a dilemma on environmental issues. First, the North tries
to avoid exerting environmental hegemony over nations of the
South, many of which only recently cast off the yoke of
^Northern' colonialism within the last century. Secondly,
the North repeatedly stresses its support of the sovereignty
of nations and the right of nations to determine their own
destiny. 11 Lastly, the citizens of the North are, per
capita, the largest exploiters of the global environment.
The South' s complaints of Northern exploitation are
summarized by Donald R. Kelley, "Their countries [U.S.,
Japan, and the former USSR] have an impact on both the local
11
Richard C. Knott, Commander, U.S. Navy (Ret), "Who Owns the Oceans", in Naval Proceedings
Magazine. CDR Knott explains that a state, however, is thought to possess the inherent right to defend
itself and to provide for the safety of its citizens and that, consequently, it became generally accepted that
a coastal state has the right to exercise sovereignty over a narrow band of the sea adjacent to its coast for
reasons of national security.
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and global ecosystems far out of proportion to their
population sizes, often have aggressive nationalist
traditions, and take pride in being x great nations' as
measured by growth rates, economic influence, and military
power. [Ref. 51:p. 9]
An additional argument presented by the supporters of
the Northern development advocates is that the environment
is being manipulated by the South for political gains. C.
Fred Bergsten, in his 1974 Foreign Policy essay, "The Threat
is Real," theorized that raw materials are being turned by
the less developed countries into new and effective
instruments of influence to be used to enhance their
position and advance their economic and political claims
vis-a-vis the industrialized world. [Ref. 52:pp. 84-90]
Under the banner of world environmental survival, the
nations of the South have re-negotiated their massive
foreign debts through debt-for-nature exchanges.
The global competition for such limited natural
resources has also been posited to have benefited the
developing countries in two important ways: exploitive
methods of resource extraction used by more developed
countries during the colonial period are no longer
acceptable; and, respect for the sovereign rights of every
nation is a generally accepted principle among democracies.
46
Hence, the Southern nations, with weaker industrial bases
and smaller populations, usually have a surplus of natural
resources with respect to the needs of their populations.
This surplus of resources equates to financial and political
leverage in environmental debates. In contrast, developed
countries, more often than not, are in a resource deficit
precisely because of their insatiable demand for raw
materials, a demand that simply reflects their more advanced
stage of industrialization. [Ref. 53:p. 84-90]
From the point of view of the South, the developed
North looks like a hypocrite. The South counters the
North's criticisms of Southern environmental exploitation by
pointing out how the North exploited their own environments
in the name of agriculture, then later, industrial
development. The exploitation of the land, air, and water
of the North propelled the North into their current lofty
position as developed nations. Now that the North has
arrived, so to speak, these developed nations want to
restrict environmental usage worldwide. This, the South
contends, is the North's attempt to keep the rich, rich, and
the poor, poor.
Supporting the South' s position, Indira Gandhi,
observed at the Stockholm Conference "that when it comes to
the depletion of natural resources and environmental
pollution, the increase of one inhabitant in an affluent
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country, at his level of living, is equivalent to an
increase of many Asians, Africans, or Latin Americans at
their current material levels of living." The biologist
Wayne Davis, in Donald R. Kelley's edited volume The
Economic Superpowers and the Environment, estimated that an
average American, in the course of his life, will consume at
least 25 times more of the world's resources and generate 25
times more waste than an average Indian or Chinese.
[Ref. 54:p. 9]
Developing countries also argue that they have no
choice but to use the environment in less than efficient
means. According to environmental scholar David L. McKee,
"Too often in developing countries, quality of life is
primarily a question of having enough food and basic
shelter." [Ref. 55:p. 188] In industrialized nations,
improving the quality of the natural environment is
perceived as a way of improving the quality of life. In
several Latin American nations, public and commercial
entities perceive protection of the environment as an
expensive luxury, well beyond their financial means.
Therefore, the South' s perspective is that the
management of the environment and the exploitation of
sovereign marine resources should be the decision of the
host nation and not of other nations. Marine boundaries,
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the focus of this study, exacerbate this North-South tension
because such boundaries often overlap, making it more
difficult to secure a nation's aquatic territorial
integrity.
In Vicente Sanchez and Calestous Juma' s edited book
Biodiplomacy: Genetic Resources and International Relations,
Hanne Svarstad summarizes the interaction and dependencies
the North and South have on each other. Figure 5
graphically depicts this relationship wherein the North is
dependent on the South for natural resources and pressures
the South to conserve these resources. The North also
weighs heavily in the debate since the South desperately
seeks technology transfer and money, which the North
continues to control.
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Conservation in the South
Access to genetic resources from the South
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Souths national sovereignty over genoiic resources
North-South transfer ot technology
Finances
Figure 5. Biodiversity Exchanges Between the North and
South. [Ref. 56 :p. 47]
2 . Intra-Regional Conflicts
The second debate of resource conflict has an intra-
regional focus. It exists between neighboring states,
whether they are North versus North, as in the case of the
acid rain controversy between the United States and Canada,
or South versus South, as in the Beagle Channel dispute
between Chile and Argentina 12 or the conflict over the Gulf
of Venezuela between Colombia and Venezuela. 13
12 The dispute over ownership of the islands in the Beagle Channel involved competing geopolitical and
strategic calculations, access to possible petroleum and other resources, and the status of conflicting
claims in the Antarctic. In 1971, Argentina and Chile agreed to submit their century-old dispute to
binding arbitration as prescribed in existing bilateral treaties. The disputants were on the verge of war in
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Essentially, the intra-regional debate pits the
economic claims of Country A against the sovereignty, real
or perceived, of Country B. Inland waterways such as the
South American river Rio Parana illustrate how one nation,
Brazil, perceives its national energy needs as more
important than the sovereign right of its neighbor,
Argentina, to the benefits of the shared river. 14
The degree of forcefulness nations project in the
intra-regional debate over environmental resources is often
dependent on size and influence. In the intra-regional
arena, the smaller regional country usually pleads its case
to supranational entities of the international community.
The country seeks to raise the ire of the world against its
dominating neighbor who is infringing upon the
internationally-accepted principles of sovereignty and self-
determination .
As previously discussed, the debates regarding
environmental issues have both international and
intraregional foci. The international debate, North vs.
South, has a much lower chance of resolution than the
late 1978 when the Vatican observer to the Organization of American States (OAS) urgently proposed
papal mediation, readily accepted by both countries on 8 January 1979. Hudson, Rex A. and others,
Chile, A Country Study, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 1994, pg. 268.
13 Colombian and Venezuelan oceanic disputes centered on access to the offshore oil resources of their
shared coastal region, the Gulf of Venezuela. Several shooting incidents in the gulf in the 1981-86 period
led both countries to mobilize troops along the border and engage in a minor arms race.
14 A major source of competition between Brazil and Argentina has been influence over the smaller,
weaker so-called buffer states (Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia) bordering both nations.
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intraregional, South vs. South, since most of the nations of
South America for the most part, share a common language,
culture, and history.
Latin America specialist G. Pope Atkins counters this
view of South American solidarity, describing the subregion
as an area of long-standing local conflict with roots in the
colonial period. The legacy includes a long list of
territorial and boundary disputes, national power struggles
that have led to warfare and threats of war, and claims of
sovereignty and competition for resources. Therefore, the
threat to Latin America from external regions must be
perceived to be great enough to overcome the perennial
suspicions and animosities among Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.
[Ref. 57:p. 70]
D . THEORY
Similar to the geographically- focused debates, there
exist competing theories relating to the cause and solutions
to environmental degradation and competing oceanic
sovereignty claims. In their comprehensive textbook,
Ecoscience: Population, Resources, Environment, Stanford
professors Paul and Anne Ehrlich categorize the competing
theoretical viewpoints on the management of natural




According to the Ehrlichs, the Cornucopians often are
preoccupied with the apparent theoretical capacity of Earth
to supply a large (but fixed) population with basic raw
materials over long spans of time. The Cornucopians argue
that technological exploitation of the vast stores of
minerals available at low concentration in seawater and in
the first few miles of Earth's crust will provide energy
sources far into the future. Thus, population and
industrial growth is not viewed as an immediate threat to
the health of the planet. However, explain the Ehrlichs,
"even ardent Cornucopians do not postulate continued
population growth beyond a few more doublings, however, for
that many people could not be sustained under any
assumptions." [Ref. 58:pp. 953-54]
In the INSS Strategic Assessment 1995 chapter on
population, resources, and conflict, Patrick Clawson states
that "In coming decades, population shifts and resource
pressures are more likely to exacerbate existing political
conflicts rather than to directly trigger them."
[Ref. 59: INTERNET] . Clawson puts himself squarely in the
Cornucopian camp with his opinion that "The balance between
population, resources, and the environment is likely to
improve in the next 20 years as a result of decreasing
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population growth rates and increasing attention to
environmentally sustainable development." [Ref. 60: INTERNET]
2. Neo-Malthusians
Countering the position of the Cornucopians, the Neo-
Malthusians argue that the Earth is nearing its maximum
capacity to sustain healthy human life. The fundamental
precept of Neo-Malthusian viewpoint is that the rapid
exhaustion of nonrenewable resources and pollution on a
widespread scale, signals an end to stable national economic
growth. Additionally, such uncontrolled usage of resources
adversely affects Equality of life' for all the Earth's
inhabitants. As Michael Renner states, "environmental
degradation imperils a nations' most fundamental aspect of
security by undermining the natural support systems on which
all of human activity depends. " [Ref . 61].
As influential proponents of the Neo-Malthusian
approach to environmental management, Stanford professors
Paul and Anne Ehrlich present the key defects in the
Cornucopians' vision as:
The presumption that advanced technology will
make energy very cheap;
The presumption that abundant, cheap energy,
if available, would prove to be sufficient;
The serious underestimation of the degree of
environmental degradation that would be
generated by the proposed technologies;
The even more serious underestimation of the




On the other hand, the Cornucopians use empirical
economic data to criticize the Neo-Malthusian viewpoint.
According to the INSS Strategic Assessment 1995:
The common view is that the world is running out of
many natural resources, yet, in the view of most economists,
the evidence suggests that mineral and agricultural products
are, if anything, becoming more readily available.
Economists look at the real (inflation-adjusted) price as
the best measure of economic availability or scarcity. Over
the last 200 years, the long-term, inflation-adjusted price
trends for a whole series of mineral and agricultural
products have been stable and declining.
[Ref . 63: INTERNET]
.
A review of oceanic sovereignty literature confirms
that both the Cornucopian and Neo-Malthusian theoretical
perspectives are represented by accomplished scholars.
In addition to theories on environmental degradation,
social science theories on military usage in resource
conflicts are needed.
3. *Small Navy" Theory
With respect to the outcome of fishery-based conflicts,
one would expect that countries with powerful navies would
win. However, that outcome has not always been forthcoming.
Naval forces of smaller nations have triumphed not from
their tactics or superior warfighting abilities but often
from default. The larger, more powerful nations simply
chose not to fully defend their maritime claims with the
overwhelmingly superior force of their navies. Domestic
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politics, not the potential power of naval forces, has
determined the actual outcomes of disputes involving the use
of naval forces. 15
Since a small navy usually operates within the national
200-mile exclusive economic water limits, the legal context
of the 1982 UNCLOS thus defines the scope of small navy's
operations. A small navy, therefore, is defined as one
which is so designed, planned, prepared, and constructed to
protect and enforce national rights, as conferred by the
UNCLOS III, within the 200nm economic exclusion zones.
These "small navies", as categorized by naval scholar
Ken Booth, make up more than 90% of the world's naval
forces. The main objectives for these "small navies" are
the defensive patrolling of coastlines and the enforcement
of regulations in their contiguous waters, rather than the
anticipation of global contingencies. [Ref. 64:p. 121]
As noted in Chapter One, most post-World War II naval
theory and analysis has grown out of the experiences of
"global navies." Massive blue-water naval operations that
pitted the forces of two warring maritime powers served as
the model for analyzing naval tactics, strategy, and policy.
Except for amphibious assaults, analysis of coastal
operations in littoral regions was not deemed valuable to
the traditional national security mission of global navies.
15 The case studies in the following analysis chapter clarify this statement.
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Now that truly effective blue-water naval warfighting
capability rests solely in the hands of a few
democratically-controlled allied nations, the importance of
analyzing blue-water operations is minimized.
The protection of the offshore estate has been
identified by maritime scholar Geoffrey Till as one of the
new tasks for these small navies. As Till observes, "the
maritime strategists have no advice to offer on... matters
connected with the protection of the offshore estate." Till
adds, "naval policy makers will find little in the
established literature of maritime strategy to help them
make their choices. " [Ref. 65:p. 203-209]
In his Ph.D. dissertation on naval policy and
fisheries, Alfred Hu identified three types of disputes: (1)
strife over contentious national claims of fisheries
(maritime); (2) employment of naval forces employed; and (3)
tensions over other national interests e.g., marine-legal
position, foreign policy, regional security, national
prestige that are involved and entangled with fisheries
disputes. [Ref. 66:p. xii]
Hu' s analysis of major fisheries-based conflicts
confirms the contention of Small Navy Theory that the
potential power of naval forces does not always correspond
to actual outcomes of disputes involving the use of naval
forces. Hu adds, "... traditional naval theory developed
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from and centering on global navies offers little guidance
to the majority of navies in the world -- the small navies."
[Ref . 67 :p. xiv]
.
The navies of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru represent this
type of "small navy," therefore the ability of these navies
to control oceanic and coastal regions is a variable under
investigation in this study.
E . VARIABLES
The dependent variable in this paper is "the likelihood
of fishery-based conflicts." The independent variables are
the level of political stability within specific South
American nations and the capability of South American navies
to enforce their maritime claims.
In general, the nation-state views its oceanic and
coastal regions as sovereign territory, not unlike its land
boundaries. Therefore, intrusion into claimed oceanic and
coastal territorial waters forces the government to respond
diplomatically at the least, and militarily if able.
F. HYPOTHESIS STATEMENTS
Based on history, economics, and politics, hypothesis
can be created and tested using current and past evidence of
resource conflicts. The following statements apply not only




1. As a nation's degree of political stability
increases , then the likelihood of a FBC decreases. National
leaders view their self-delineated or UNCLOS Ill-mandated
ocean boundaries as sovereign territory. Therefore,
intrusion into these territorial waters forces the civilian
government to respond diplomatically or militarily to its
perceived external threat. By acting on their nationalistic
rhetoric, politicians can capitalize on the perception of
strength and independence from foreign influence. In the
nations of Latin America there is an especially dire need
for politicians to avoid being characterized as a puppet of
former colonial or hegemonic powers. The deterrence of
foreign aggression, in the form of deploying naval forces to
protect ocean areas, is then used as a domestic political
issue for a head-of-state facing reelection and popularity
polls.
The political desire to prop up weak administrations
can lead politicians of smaller nations to commit their
limited naval forces against larger nations. To add to
their national insecurity, the economies of these Andean
nations are intimately tied to the sustainment of productive
ocean fisheries. If overfishing leads to a collapse of
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these fisheries, a resulting employment crisis will force
local, municipal, and national political leaders to react. 16
2. As foreign exchange earnings from fishery products
increase, then likelihood of FBCs increases. As a nation's
government leaders and population realize the importance of
substantial export earnings derived from fishery products,
the government will be more likely to commit naval forces to
protect its maritime interests. In addition to export
earnings, the amount of employment that a nation's fishery
industry provides is an economic factor that can induce
leaders to deploy naval forces to enforce oceanic territory
claims
.
3. If fishery protection capability is relatively
dissimilar among protagonists, then the likelihood of FBCs
is increased. If the fishery protection capability of two
nations is dissimilar (i.e., United States vs. Ecuador or
United Kingdom vs. Iceland), then the weaker nation will be
inclined to conduct an aggressive naval action to improve
national pride and possibly to bolster the domestic
political standing of the head-of-state. Additionally, the
political influence and economic clout of the maritime
powers can resolve FBCs before a military solution becomes
16
Peter Weber provides this causal linkage description in his essay in Lester Brown's, State of the Wold
1995, W.W.Norton & Company, New York, 1995, pgs 24-36.
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necessary. This hypothesis is in accordance with the
principles of the "'Small Navy Theory"
.
4. If fishery protection capability is relatively
similar amongst protagonists, then likelihood of FBCs
decreases. If the fishery protection capability of two
nations is similar, then the nations will realize the
detriment of a prolonged naval conflict and not consider the
economic benefits worth the potential loss of life.
Therefore, nations with similar naval capabilities will seek
methods other than direct combat to resolve fishery-based
conflicts, i.e. international arbitration.
5. If UNCLOS III provisions and bilateral agreements
are respected by both coastal and distant-water fishing
nations, then the likelihood of FBCs decreases. If nations
consider the UNCLOS III and their own bilateral fishing
agreements as binding international law, negotiation and
arbitration have a higher probability of success in
resolving FBCs than military heavihandedness.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter laid the foundation for the analysis of
causal factors of fishery-based conflicts in western South
America. The fundamental research questions were presented
and can be summed in the overly-simplistic question, "Who
owns the oceans?"
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Current international relations debates regarding
environmental issues usually fall into the sphere of
international or intraregional focus. In the international
arena, the developed nations are pitted against the
developing nations while the intraregional debate places
neighboring states against each other regardless of their
level of economic development.
Regarding the use of natural resources, the theories of
the "Cornucopians" and the Neo-Malthusians make different
assumptions about scarcity and thus arrive at different
predictions on the potential for conflict. The Cornucopians
view the world has having the ability to sustain perpetually
human life through a combination of resource exploitation
and technological development. The Neo-Malthusians
recognize the limits of the Earth's capacity sustaining life
through tangible evidence including resource over-
exploitation, environmental destruction, and an ever-
increasing world population.
Political and military debates surrounding resource
exploitation and oceanic sovereignty include Ken Booth'
s
observation that small navies, sometime by default, defeat
larger, more powerful naval forces.
Lastly, this chapter provided hypothesis statements as
a starting point for analyzing causal factors in
environmentally-based conflicts.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CASES
Oceanic sovereignty conflicts are characterized by
concerns over access to commercial shipping lanes,
exploitation of living and non-living marine resources, and
island ownership. The Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982
between the United Kingdom and Argentina arguably can be
said to have been an example of the extent to which a nation
will go to maintain or recapture their perceived sovereignty
of the islands and ocean areas.
The study of resource conflicts and oceanic sovereignty
issues represents a unique challenge in social science
research. The unit-of-analysis is not the nation-state or
individual, as is the case in traditional security studies
research, but the natural resource in question or the
perceived ownership of disputed resources. Therefore,
theories and predictions based on conventional national
security concepts (i.e., balance of power, containment of
Communism, and gunboat diplomacy) are not always applicable
in evaluating resource-based conflicts. For example, Japan
has absolutely no national security concern of an invasion
by amphibious forces from the Chilean Navy, yet actions by
the Chilean government to alter the world' s fish supply
would have severe national consequences to such a seafood-
dependent nation as Japan. Therefore, case studies of
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resource-based conflicts must be examined under the
framework of environmental, political/ and economic
influences.
A. CASE STUDIES
The case studies chosen for this thesis include two
examples of fishery-based conflicts involving Andean nations
and one example of an out-of-area FBC. The 1972 x Cod War'
between Iceland and the United Kingdom was chosen to
determine if political stability and naval enforcement
capability play a significant role in fishery-based
conflicts involving other than South American nations.
Additionally, selection of an out-of-area case can further
test if the x Small Navy' theory applies to two historically
and culturally diverse regions; western South America and
Northern Europe.
1. The U.S. -Peruvian xxTuna War" of 1969
In the pre-dawn hours of February 14, 1969, an English-
built Peruvian PT boat armed with machine guns and 2 0mm
cannon began shadowing U.S. tuna vessels 40 miles off Peru's
coast. At dawn, the naval vessel collided with one of the
U.S. -flagged vessels in an attempt to board her. The
Peruvians then landed a boarding party which guided the
damaged San Diego-based fishing boat to a Peruvian port
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where its captain was forced to buy a license and fined, the
total came to about $10,500.
Meanwhile, another Peruvian naval vessel headed for the
fishing boat, San Juan. Failing to board the elusive ship,
the Peruvians fired between 40 and 60 machine gun bullets
into her upper parts. Gun fire hit the skiff, destroyed
windows in the pilot house, damaged the vessel's radio,
sprayed the port side of the crew's quarters, damaged the
radar antenna and barely missed the captain. Suddenly the
pursuit ended, either because the Peruvian commander did not
want to make the incident any worse, or because other
American vessels in the vicinity (there were about five
other tuna clippers nearby) began moving in threateningly.
[Ref. 68:pp. 8-9]
It is interesting to note that in Thomas Wolff s
description of this naval dispute, Peruvian units were
deployed to protect their territorial waters but did not
engage the commercial fishing boats. Most probably,
Peruvian reluctance signaled either a lack of naval
warfighting ability or a fear of drawing the U.S. Navy into
the skirmish.
a. Political Stability
Peruvian political stability at the time of the
1969 xTuna War' with the United States was at a relatively
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low point in the modern history of that country. Only a
year prior, the armed forces of Peru, under the command of
General Velasco Alvarado, had overthrown the reformist
government of Fernando Belaunde Terry. Velasco immediately
instituted sweeping changes to recapture state control of
vital industries from the hands of foreign interests. At
the beginning of his administration in 1968, 75% of mining,
50% of manufacturing, 50% of the commercial banking system,
and 33% of the fishing industry were in the hands of foreign
entities. [Ref. 69:pp. 50-51]
In addition to domestic issues, General Velasco
also completed important reforms of Peruvian foreign policy.
Peru led the way in establishing tighter intraregional
relations with the creation of the Andean Pact, an economic
trading bloc composed of Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador,
and Peru. To further bolster their regime, strengthen the
Peruvian economy, and distance itself from the political and
economic influences of the United States, the Velasco
Administration "moved to diversify its foreign relations by
making trading pacts with the Soviet Union and East European
countries, as well as with Japan and West European nations."
Another successful initiative of Velasco was to defend the
Peruvian claim of territorial seas 200nm into the Pacific
Ocean. [Ref. 70:p. 51]
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The degree of political instability present in
Peru in 1969 suggests that, according to previously-
mentioned hypotheses, the likelihood of a fishery-based
conflict was high during the Velasco years. This extremely
high degree of political instability may have encouraged
government leaders to show resolve by deploying naval forces
against a foreign power ^invading' perceived Peruvian
oceanic territory.
Jb. Naval Enforcement Capability
From 1968-1972, Peru had a naval enforcement
capability far inferior to that of its 1969 fishery-based
conflict adversary, the United States. The Peruvian Navy at
the time was primarily a coastal and riverine force with
limited ocean-going capability. The coastal patrol boats of
the Peruvian Navy were absolutely no match militarily for
the U.S. Navy or U.S. Coast Guard.
However, the Peruvian Navy successfully defended
its maritime claims and forced foreign commercial vessels
from their waters. Commercial fishermen from the United
States and other nations had to refrain from fishing
Peruvian waters or risk seizures and substantial fines.
Only through subsequently enacted bilateral fishery
agreements were foreign fleets safe to freely fish the
disputed waters off the Peruvian coast.
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Therefore, from a naval standpoint, Peru 'won'
this x Tuna War.' However, it was a shallow victory since
the outcome was unquestionably due to the fact that the
vastly superior U.S. Navy was not directed to engage the
Peruvian naval forces harassing U.S. commercial interests.
Hence, the smaller navy in this case xwon' due to default.
2. The U.S. -Ecuadorian "Tuna War" of 1971
Between 11-17 January 1971, Ecuadorian patrol boats
seized four U.S. tuna clippers which were reportedly between
48 and 60 miles off Ecuador's coast. The captains of two of
the vessels, the Hornet and the Apollo, reported that during
the encounter their boats had been strafed by unidentified
fighter planes. Afterward, the Apollo captain reported that
later in the fishery dispute, it had been fired upon by an
Ecuadorian warship.
a. Political Stability
Ecuadorian politics has historically been
characterized by instability, inefficiency, and change [Ref
.
71:p.3]. Economic upheavals, based on an over-reliance on a
single export commodity, has exacerbated the political chaos
and thus led to military adventurism. The need to prop up
weak administrations and protect state-dependent commodities
has inspired political leaders to deploy military forces in
instances where the adversary was much stronger.
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The 1971 "Tuna War" against the United States
represented this type of Ecuadorian political adventurism.
At the time of this fishery-based conflict, the Ecuadorian
President, Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra, had recently completed
a self-seizure of power (autogolpe) when he dismissed
Congress and the Supreme Court and assumed all political
power.
The political environment in Ecuador had
deteriorated to the point that Velasco had to institute
severe economic austerity measures to prevent the Ecuadorian
economy and his regime from collapsing. The causal link
between Ecuadorian political instability and the
commencement of a fishery-based conflict is summed in the
book Ecuador, A Country Study. Editor Rex A. Hudson states,
"Velasco attempted to compensate for his lost prestige [due
to enacting sever economic austerity measures] by baiting
the United States, seizing and fining U.S. fishing. boats
found within 200nm of the Ecuadorian coast." [Ref. 72:pp.
40-41]
.
The political instability of Ecuador continued in
its characteristically historic way when, less than a year
after the "Tuna War, " Velasco lost support of the military
high command and suffered a military-led coup.
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b. Naval Enforcement Capability
The naval enforcement capability of the Ecuadorian
Navy to defend their maritime claims against the U.S. Navy
was, as it is today, non-existent. Fortunately for the
Ecuadorian Navy, the U.S. Government chose not to respond
militarily to the seizure of U.S. commercial fishing vessels
and instead withdrew almost all economic and military aid to
Ecuador.
During this period, Ecuador and Peru were the only
two Latin American states actively using force to assert
their national maritime claims. Professor Virginia Hagen
clarified the political stability of Ecuador and Peru
stating, "The greatest number of seizure incidents involved
the U.S. tuna fleets operating off the coasts of these two
states." [Ref. 73:p. 43].
The intensification of the "Tuna Wars" of the
early 1970s inflamed tempers in both countries; Ecuador
dismissed U.S. military advisers, and the United States
withdrew most economic and military aid to Ecuador.
[Ref. 74:p. 41]
Thus, it can be argued that Ecuador and Peru had a
sufficiently low degree of political stability and a
substantially dissimilar naval enforcement capability than
its fishery-based conflict adversary.
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3. U.K. -Icelandic "Cod Wars" of 1958-1976
The United Kingdom and Iceland engaged in a series of
violent and bloody fishery-based conflicts from 1958 to
1976. At heart in their conflicts was the limits to
exclusive exploitation of the seas surrounding the island-
nation of Iceland.
Scholar Jeffery A. Hart categorized the series of
fishery-based conflicts between Iceland and the United
Kingdom into three major episodes: the first "Cod War" began
in 1958 and ended in 1961; the second began in 1972 and
ended in 1973; and the third began in 1975 and ended in 1976
[Ref. 75:p. 1] . Hart found similarity in each of these
"wars' , stating:
"Each of these 'wars' has involved confrontations
between Icelandic gunboats and British frigates and
trawlers. In each, several people were injured or killed.
Despite obvious disparity between the military might of
Britain and that of Iceland, all three cod wars ended in
agreements that were highly favorable to the Icelanders .
"
[Ref. 76:p. 1]
Another commonality in these fishery-based conflicts
was that all began because of the same reason: the
unilateral expansion of Icelandic territorial waters and
fishery jurisdiction. According to former Icelandic Press
Secretary Hannes Jonsson17 , the Icelandic government, in its
17
Hannes Jonsson served as Secretary for Press and Information for the Icelandic Prime Minister from
1971-1974. In his published doctoral dissertation he examines in great detail the fishery-based conflicts
between Iceland and the Britain from the 1940s to the 1970s.
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efforts to protect its most important national industry,
needed to expand its claim to fisheries from 3nm to 4nm in
1952, from 4nm to 12nm in 1958, from 12nm to 50nm in 1972,
and finally from 50nm to 200nm in 1975.
[Ref. 77:pp. 48-183]
The Icelandic government stressed to the British and
world community that they perceived fishery protection as
vital to their existence as a sovereign nation. During the
first of the cod wars, Icelandic Prime Minister Hermann
Jonasson, on 7 September 1958, stated, "Fishing is more
vital to us than any other nation, and we must therefore, be
entitled to the most favorable conditions in this field."
[Ref. 78:p. 88]. Later, during the third cod war, the
Icelandic government sent a letter to the President of the
U.N. Security Council which clarified the Icelandic
position, "...no other independent state is so dependent
upon ocean fishing as Iceland. Conservation of the fish
stocks around Iceland is a matter of life and death for the
Icelandic nation..." [Ref. 79:p. 165]. The opposing
viewpoint of the British government was that neither Iceland
nor any other government could prohibit fishing in areas of
the ocean previously considered international high seas.
[Ref. 80:pp. 84-85]
The "Cod Wars" provide cases outside of South American
waters where the naval forces of a smaller nation, the
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Icelandic Coast Guard, defended its maritime claims against
a far superior naval force, in this case the British Royal
Navy. 18 Surprisingly, the outcomes of all three *Cod Wars''
favored Iceland. British leaders accepted Icelandic claims
to more ocean areas and limited British commercial fishing
interests from exploiting Icelandic waters. Additionally,
Britain suffered public relations failures due to the
appearance it was acting as hegemonic power intent on
crushing a militarily weaker NATO ally. Thus, in these
fishery-based conflicts, the smaller navy Von.'
4 . Chile
Chile represents a deviant case in the study of
fishery-based conflicts of western South America. Chile is
special because of its historic absence from participation
in fishery-based conflicts.
a. Political Stability
Historically, political stability has been as
consistently present in Chile as it has been consistently
absent in Ecuador and Peru. The perennial quest of the
Chilean people for democratic institutions and principles
has set them apart from the majority of their Latin American
18
Jonsson reported in his PhD dissertation that from September 1958 to February 1961, 37 British
destroyers and frigates with approximately 7,000 crewmembers faced 6 small Icelandic Coast Guard boats
with a total of 103 crewmembers. The military odds were as one-sided during the second cod war, when
from September 1972 to May 1973, an Icelandic Coast Guard force of only seven small ships and 139
crewmembers squared-off against seven British frigates, four tugboats, three auxiliary ships, totaling
1,854 crewmembers. The British force also included a number ofNATO Nirnrod observation aircraft.
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neighbors. According to Chile, A Country Study, "From 1830
until 1973, almost all of Chile's presidents stepped down at
the end of their prescribed terms in office to make way for
constitutionally designated successors." [Ref. 81:p.200].
Although all three nations, Chile, Ecuador, and
Peru are signatories on one of the most internationally
contentious oceanic sovereignty documents, The 1952
Declaration of Santiago, only Chile has not participated in
any serious fishery-based conflicts. This absence of
oceanic disputes involving Chile is consistent with the
proposition that political stability decreases the
likelihood of fishery-based conflicts. From 1968-1972, the
same period that Peru, Ecuador, and Iceland (in the North
Atlantic) were engaged in fishery-based conflicts, Chile
initiated no such disputes.
While the Chilean political situation was more
stable than the situations in Ecuador and Peru, the Marxist
regime of Salvador Allende was replete with destabilizing
influences. Chile's non-participation in fishery-based
conflicts during this period suggest that other domestic
political factors play in the likelihood of FBCs. Political
stability and dissimilar naval enforcement capabilities may




b. Naval Enforcement Capability
Surprisingly, from 1968-1972 Chile, with a more
capable navy than either Ecuador or Peru, did little to
exert any influence over its claimed ocean areas.
B. CURRENT POLITICAL STABILITY OF CHILE, ECUADOR, AND PERU
Recent events in both Ecuador and Peru have once again
challenged their political leadership and illustrated that
political stability remains an elusive target for these two
nations. 19 Economic and political crises (currency
devaluations, coup d'etats, etc.) of the past and present
have caused political turmoil which has resulting in police
and military force deployments in Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.
Therefore, determining the degree of current political
stability in Chile, Ecuador, and Peru may lead to
predictions on whether their administrations will value the
potential loss of human life in fishery-based conflicts
worth the potential financial or political benefit.
15
For four months, Tupac Amaru rebels held 170 high-ranking diplomats hostage at the Japanese
embassy in Lima. The crisis ended when Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori ordered special para-
military forces to storm the embassy, resulting in the deaths of two diplomats and all 14 rebels. Although
the Tupac Amaru rebels suffered severe losses, the guerrilla group continues to exist, as does the more
violent Sendero Luminosa, fueling instability in Peru.
In Ecuador, the recently-elected president, Asaad Elmhalim Bucaram, was deposed by the
Ecuadorean Congress yet refused to leave office. After several tense weeks in Quito, power was wrestled
from Bucaram, popularly referred to as "El Loco" (The Crazy One).
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Table 1 summarizes several factors that indicate a
country's degree of political stability. Based on the
results of this chart, Chile of the 1990s remains
significantly more politically stable than Peru or Ecuador
and therefore less likely to instigate a fishery-based
conflict
.


















less than 1 year 7 years
(won election in 1990;
autogolpe in 1992; new won
elections in 1995)
Latest mandate 57.4% of overall vote 27%
no candidate received more
than 50% of the vote
64.4% of popular vote
Existence of loyal opposition YES YES YES




























Table 1. Current Political Stability Factors of
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.
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C. CURRENT NAVAL ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES OF CHILE,
ECUADOR, AND PERU
The capability to enforce national maritime claims is
related to the likelihood of fishery-based conflicts
transitioning from verbal or commercial spates into military
conflicts. The potential of engaging a similarly-equipped
naval force battling over oceanic access and/or resources
would lead to severe losses to both parties. Therefore,
based on the cases of this thesis and with other political
and economic factors excluded, a wide disparity in naval
enforcement capability among belligerents increases the
likelihood of fishery-based conflict.
With respect to enforcing their oceanic sovereignty
claims, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru are faced with similar
naval enforcement challenges. All three nations must defend
their claimed ocean areas from overexploitation by distant-
water fishing fleets yet the capability to perform such
naval missions is different among these Andean nations.
The Center for Naval Analysis, in its report Future
Naval Cooperation With Latin America: Final Report, probably
provides the most accurate characterization of the
capabilities of the Chilean, Peruvian, and Ecuadorian
navies. They report found that Chile has a "near-NATO"
level blue-water naval force, Peru has a professional navy
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capable of limited out-of-area operations, and Ecuador has
primarily a green-water coastal navy [Ref. 82:pp. 2&29]
1 . Chile
The Chilean Navy is the most proficient naval force on
the western coast of South America. Naval surface
combatants and submarines train with U.S. Navy units in
annual bilateral exercises. The senior civilian and
military leadership of Chile have committed themselves to
backing up their maritime claims with appropriate military
capability. Seizing fishing trawlers and preventing illegal
fishing is well within the capability of the Chilean Navy.
Additionally, the Chilean Navy maintains substantial
influence in Chilean politics having won the battle against
the Chilean Air Force to own all military aircraft flying
over the sea. Naval aviation units adequate for the
maritime surveillance and monitoring mission include the
Lockheed P-3 and several helicopter types. [Ref. 83:p. 103]
As Table 3 illustrates, the Chilean Navy possesses the
gross tonnage, ship types, and weapon systems to protect its
UNCLOS Ill-delineated territorial seas out to 12 nautical
miles. Against regional foes, i.e. Peru, Colombia, or
Argentina, the Chilean Navy is superior. The Chilean Navy's
training and tactics are superior to its neighboring naval
forces because of its historical experience with Prussian
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military doctrine and more recently, due to the Navy'
s
adoption of U.S. naval tactics and training.
However, against a politically-committed naval force
from North America, Western Europe, or the Russian Pacific
Fleet, the Chilean Navy could not defend its self-proclaimed
territorial waters to 200nm and beyond. To its credit,
Chile procured the highly lethal Exocet anti-ship missiles
for its primary weapon system against surface combatants.
As the following chart depicts, the principal limiting
factor to the Chilean Navy's use of such modern, high-tech
weaponry is that they currently have only two platform from
which to deploy the missiles, the Pratt County class
destroyers and the Leander class frigates.
The Chilean Navy has the naval enforcement capability
to defend its oceanic sovereignty claims but has not yet
been directed to do so by the Chilean political leadership.
Up to this point, Chilean leaders have found non-military
solutions (including bilateral fishery agreements and
fishery quota systems) to oceanic sovereignty issues.
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Type Active Proj Weapons Systems
Patrol submarines (2 x Type-209; 2 x 4 (4) 8 x 21 in. Torpedo tubes
Oberon class)
Pratt County class destroyers 4 2 x 4.5in guns; 2 x 40mm cannons; 1 x 12.7mm
machine gun; 6 x MK32 torps; 4 x Exocet SSMs;
2xSAMs
Leander class frigates 4 2 x 4.5in guns; 2 x 20mm cannon; 4 x Exocet
SSMs
Patrol ships 1 (4)
Casma class fast attack craft (missile) 2 2 x 3in OTO Melara gun;
4 x IAI Gabriel SSMs
Fast attack craft (missile) 2 1 x 3in OTO Melara gun;
2 x 12.7mm machine guns
4 x IAI Gabriel SSMs
Guacolda class fast attack craft (torpedo) 4 - 2 x 40mm cannon; 4 x 21in torps
Micalvi class large patrol craft 4 1 x 40mm cannon;
2 x 20mm cannon
Grumete Diaz class patrol craft 10 1 x 20mm cannon;
1 x 12.7mm machine gun
Protector class patrol craft 4 -
Patrol vessel (WPC) 1 - 2 x 12.7 machine guns
Light coastal patrol craft (LPC) 12 - 2 x 20mm cannon
Inshore patrol craft (PBI) 14 - 1 x 12.7mm machine gun
Table 2. Chilean Naval Order-of-Battle
.
[Ref . 84:p. 103-113]
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2 . Ecuador
Among the three nations subject to this study, Ecuador
has by far the least effective naval force in terms of gross
tonnage, lethality, and readiness. The Ecuadorian Navy
maintains the capability to conduct coastal defense and
inland waterway missions but lacks the ability to defend
maritime claims out to 200nm. To compensate for this lack
of size and influence, the Ecuadorian political leadership
has in rhetoric and actions displayed a repeated willingness
to commit naval forces to protect its maritime interests.
As the following chart shows, Ecuador does not possess
an ocean-going fleet. Operationally, naval units and naval
aviation assets are sufficient for coastal patrolling and
limited fishery enforcement but not adept for sustained at-
sea combat. Whether the naval adversary is from a regional
state or from afar, the Ecuadorian Navy cannot defend its
maritime claims of 200nm of territorial waters as stipulated
in the 1952 Declaration of Santiago. Any opposing naval
force would have the numerical and weaponry superiority over
the Ecuadorian Navy and thus, win any intense naval
engagement.
Therefore, the Ecuadorian Navy must continue to use
tactics of seizures and harassment of commercial vessels
perceived to be in violation of Ecuadorian oceanic
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sovereignty. However, any escalation of tensions or
military response to such seizures by a maritime power
nation would be disastrous to the Ecuadorian Navy. An
alliance of naval forces among Chile, Ecuador, and Peru
would be the best course of action for Ecuador to pursue in
enforcing its maritime boundaries.
Type Active Proj Weapons Systems
Patrol submarines (2 x Type-209 class) 2 - 8 x 21 in. Torpedo tubes
Leander class frigates 2 2 Bofors 40mm guns; 2 x 20mm cannon; 4 x MM38
Exocet SSMs; SAMs; 1 x Bell 206B helicopter
Esmeraldas Class Corvettes (FSG) 6 2 x 4.5in guns; 2 x 20mm cannon; 6 x MM40 Exocet
SSMs; SAMs; 6 x 324mm torpedo tubes; 1 x Bell
206B helicopter
Patrol ships 1 (4)
Quito (Lurssen) Class fast attack craft 3 - 1 x 3in OTO Melara gun; 2 x 12.7mm guns; 4 x
(missile) MM38 Exocet SSMs
Manta Class fast attack craft (missile) 3 2 x 30mm Emerson Electric guns;
4 x IAI Gabriel SSMs
Espada Class large patrol craft 2 1 x Bohors 40mm gun;
2 x 12.7mm machine guns
PGM-71 Class large patrol craft 2 1 x Bohors 40mm gun;
4 x Oerlikon 20mm; 2 x 12.7mm MGs
Light coastal patrol craft (LPC) 2 - 2 x 7.62mm MGs
River patrol craft (PB) 8 - 2 x 12.7mm machine gun; 2 x 7.6mm MGs





Peru possesses the third largest navy in South America
behind Brazil and Argentina. Peru's Navy is similar to that
of Chile and substantially greater than that of Ecuador.
Peru's underwater capability is greater than any of its
neighbors. Also, Peru's 4 LUPO-Class frigates and 6 fast
attack missile craft are the most lethal naval units on the
western South American coasts because of their speed,
versatility, and weapons system.
Therefore, with respect to tonnage, type and number of
ships, and weapons systems, Peru has appropriate naval
enforcement capability to defend its national maritime
claims against inter-regional actors. Also, Peru can defend
its coastal waters and fisheries within its disputed 200nm
territorial waters against distant fishing nations such as
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Cuba, and China.
However, the naval forces of the United States, United
Kingdom, Russia, and several western European nations are
far superior to the Peruvian Navy. Based on the Peruvian
naval order-of-battle depicted in Table 5, any of the
maritime power nations would handily defeat the Peruvian
Navy in a fishery-based conflict.
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Type Active Proj Weapons Systems
Patrol submarines (2 x Type-209 Class) 6 - 8 x 21 in. Torpedo tubes
De Ruyter Class cruiser 1 4 x Bofors 6in. guns; 4 x Bofors 40mm guns;
depth charges; helicopter w/ AM39 Exocet A
De Ruyter Class cruiser-missile 1 8 x OTO Melara SSMs; 8 x Bofors 6in. guns;
8 x Bofors 40mm guns; depth charges
Daring Class destroyer 1 8 x MM38 Exocet SSMs; 6 x Vickers 4.5in.
guns; 4 x Breda 40mm guns; Helicopter
platform
Meliton Carvajal (Lupo) Class frigates 4 8 x OTO Melara SSMs; 8 x Aspide SAMs; 1
x OTO Melara Sin. gun; 4 x Breda 40mm
guns; 6 x 324mm ILAS torpedoes; 1 x Agusta
AB 212ASW helicopter
Verarde Class fast attack craft (missile) 6 4 x MM38 Exocet SSMs; 1 x 3in OTO
Melara gun; 2 x Breda 40mm guns
Rio Canete Class large patrol craft 5 1 x Bofors 40mm gun; 1 x Oerlikon 20mm
gun
Vosper Type large patrol craft 2 - 2 x Bofors 40mm gun
Naval Aviation - Agusta/Sikorsky ASH-3D Sea
King
3 4 x Mk 46 torpedoes; 2 x AM39 Exocet SSMs
Naval Aviation - Beechcraft Super KingAir 200T 3 unharmed; coastal surveillance and EEZ
patrol duties
Table 4. Peruvian Naval Order-of-Battle. [Ref. 86:p. 501-509]
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D . ASSESSMENT
An examination of fishery-based conflicts case studies
and the histories of Chile, Ecuador, Peru reveal that both
research variables, political stability and naval
enforcement capability, play a role in the likelihood of
fishery-based conflict.
Currently, Chilean political stability is the highest
of the three nations of this study. According to the
hypotheses of this thesis, this relatively high degree of
political stability minimizes the likelihood of fishery-
based conflicts involving Chile.
The Chilean Navy's enforcement capability against its
neighbors is either similar or moderately superior.
Therefore, without a vastly dissimilar naval enforcement
capability relative to its neighboring countries, the
likelihood of a FBC against another western South American
nation is low.
However, against a politically committed naval force
from a distant-water nation such as the United States or the
United Kingdom, the Chilean Navy's enforcement ability is
virtually non-existent. Because of this disparity in naval
enforcement capability the likelihood of future naval
conflict in the waters surrounding the EEZ of Chile is
assessed as medium against nations outside South America.
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The relative political stability of Chile and its
historic record of non-engagement in fishery-based conflicts
prevent the assessment of high for Chile against any
adversary.
Ecuador, easily the most politically unstable of the
three Andean nations, has shown a surprisingly high
propensity to defend militarily its oceanic sovereignty
claims. Its repeated seizures of U.S. fishing vessels in
the early 1970s challenged the naval and political might of
the United States. Thus, the political will to deploy naval
forces is higher in Ecuador than in Chile or Peru.
In terms of the specific variables under investigation
in this thesis, Ecuador has the highest likelihood of
engaging in another fishery-based conflict. Ecuadorian
political stability ranks significantly lower than those of
Chile and Peru. Also, there exist a substantially
dissimilar naval enforcement capability between the
Ecuadorian Navy and any other western South American navy or
the navies of an external country, the Ecuadorian Navy will
These combined factors suggest that the possibility of
future resource-based naval conflict is greatest in the
waters off the Ecuadorian coast.
However, the Ecuadorian Navy is ill-equipped to sustain
intensive naval engagements and therefore can only protect
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its claimed waters to the extent that a distant-water nation
chooses not to engage.
The Peruvian Navy, on the other hand, can defend
effectively its claimed maritime boundaries against its
inter-regional neighbors and all but the largest of maritime
powers. The question in the Peruvian case would be whether
the political will and/or low enough degree of political
stability exists to force the Peruvian leadership to deploy
its navy for such an economic-based mission.
Table 5 summarizes the preceding assessments of the
likelihood of future fishery-based conflicts involving
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.




Chile LOW LOW MED MED
Ecuador LOW HIGH HIGH HIGH
Peru LOW HIGH MED MED
Table 5. Potential Conflict Matrix
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E. SUMMARY
All three nations of this study have demonstrated low
degrees of political stability at various times since their
independence from Spanish colonial rule.
Case studies have shown that a low degree of political
stability, whether manifested in the form of regime
bolstering or protecting the national economy, is a
necessary but not sufficient cause of fishery-based
conflicts. In each of the fishery-based conflict cases, a
low degree of political stability or threat to regime
survival was evident. The degree of political stability was
not the sole factor in determining the likelihood of the
disputes and therefore, cannot be said to be a sufficient
cause.
Similarly, based solely on these three cases,
dissimilar naval enforcement capability, has been shown to
be a necessary but not sufficient cause of FBCs . The sole
fact that countries have vastly different naval forces does
not increase their likelihood of engaging in FBCs. However,
after evaluating the three cases in this thesis, all of the
conflicts possessed the characteristic of one nation having
overwhelmingly superior naval forces. Surprisingly, in
these cases, a hugely superior navy did not effect the
outcome of the dispute. Domestic politics may have more
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effect on the occurrence and outcome of fishery-based
conflicts
.
The final chapter of this thesis builds upon the
historical, theoretical, and analytical evidence presented
previously to determine the foreign policy implications of
fishery-based conflicts in the southeastern Pacific Ocean.
Also, evaluated are the challenges oceanic sovereignty





The causal factors which led to previous fishery-based
conflicts in western South America continue to exist. The
volatile mix of nationalistic coastal states pitted against
more powerful distant fishing nations virtually ensures the
occurrence of future maritime disputes.
The powerful "haves" of the developed world will find
it increasingly difficult to exert their past domination
over "have-nots" of the developing world with respect to
lucrative and vital biological resources of the world'
s
oceans. With increased threats to regime survival and as
domestic political stability weakens, the government leaders
of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru will be under pressure to defend
their nations' claims to the resources of the sea.
Peter Weber' s view that fisheries are part of the
public trust and a responsibility of the government
acknowledges the fact that "...there is always a role for
government, whether enforcing the right of a community to
bar outsiders and manage its own fisheries, or by pursuing
more active regulation and patrolling." [Ref. 87 :p. 36]
The demands by foreign fishing fleets upon the disputed
ocean areas claimed by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru require
constant monitoring and potent enforcement capabilities.
Against the naval forces of one of the world's maritime
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powers, those fishery protection capabilities do not
currently exist in Western South America. Therefore, to
Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, fishery protection operations will
encourage increases in x green-water' naval weapons
procurements as these Andean nations enter the 21st century.
All nations seek to protect their economic and cultural
survival. The wealth gained by exploiting the coastal and
oceanic regions of the southeastern Pacific Ocean, can
encourage states to exploit fisheries until the resource is
exhausted. International condemnation of the exploitation
of these natural resources will not supplant the states'
desire to grow and modernize. South American nations will
continue to charge hypocrisy when industrialized nations
argue for protecting the South' s environment after pillaging
their own resources in the name of industrialized growth.
Countering Marc A. Levy's conclusion that only ozone
depletion and climate change pose direct threats to U.S.
interests [Ref. 88:p. 61], this study concludes that
environmental degradation in general and FBCs specifically
may lead the U.S. Navy into further non-traditional missions
such as fisheries monitoring and high-seas peacekeeping
missions. Maintaining the peace in resource-rich regions
such as the southeastern Pacific Ocean will continue to be a
challenge of the budgetary-constrained U.S. Navy.
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In sum, this paper dealt with three major questions.
First, will continued over-exploitation of ocean resources
cause an international or intra-regional conflict involving
Chile, Ecuador, and/or Peru? The answer to this can only be
conjectural, but consistent with the theories and of the
environmental Neo-Malthusians, resource conflict in such a
fertile and lucrative area as the southeastern Pacific Ocean
is virtually guaranteed.
The second major thesis question was whether the degree
of political stability present in a nation cause
governmental leaders to deploy naval forces. Analysis and
application of theory leads to the conclusion that political
stability, or more accurately political instability, is a
principal causal factor in fishery-based conflicts. Whether
political stability is based on a desire to prop up a
struggling administration, in the cases of Peru and Ecuador,
or protect a vital national economic resource, in the case
of Iceland, political instability will cause heads-of-state
to deploy naval forces.
The final research question addressed by this paper was
whether Chile, Ecuador, and Peru have the naval enforcement
capability to enforce their maritime claims. Based on the
research data collected, including naval inventory and crew
proficiency, Chile and Peru have the capability to protect
military their claimed 200nm territorial waters from
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essentially all but the strongest of global navies. The
Ecuadorian Navy, on the other hand, cannot defend its
oceanic claims past 12nm territorial boundary stipulated in
the UNCLOS III unless an adversary chooses not to oppose
However, one must caveat such statements because without the
political will to deploy naval forces, possibly highest in
Ecuador, a nation's numerical naval strength is practically
irrelevant in defending its oceanic sovereignty claims.
A. RECOMMENDATIONS
This study suggests that policy-makers interested in
international order and cooperation should adhere to the
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, or other multi and
bilateral fishery agreements. Bilateral agreements between
nations with distant-water fishing fleets and Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru represent the best means for avoiding
fishery-based conflicts. Through the use of quotas, these
bilateral marine resource agreements can be crafted to
respect simultaneously the controversial 200nm territorial
declarations of the Andean states while ensuring the
economic use of fisheries for the world's maritime powers.
It is vital for the developing world to address this
source of international conflicts immediately because
fisheries supplies will always be stressed since the global
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demand for fish is expected to continue its steady growth as
the world's population expands.
According to the INSS, the world is increasingly beset
by resource-based problems that involve the "global
commons, " areas such as the oceans and the atmosphere that
are supposedly owned collectively by all nations rather than
being the sovereign territory of any single nation. The
INSS offers optimism on the likelihood of future fishery-
based conflicts by concluding that, w [With respect to
abiding with international treaties] In order to secure
compliance from non-cooperating countries, the most likely
route is to use trade restrictions and privileges. Military
force is not likely to be useful..." [Ref. 89: INTERNET]
This view of non-usage of military force in environmental
conflicts is probably accurate in describing the actions of
politically stable, developed nations but not as accurate in
predicting the actions of politically unstable countries.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AMERICAN POLICY
Even with the establishment of the internationally-
disputed 200nm territorial zone in 1952, there was still
concern among Chile, Ecuador, and Peru that valuable species
of fish and marine life inhabiting and straddling their
disputed 200nm territorial waters were in danger of being
seriously depleted, if not becoming extinct. This fear was
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based and continues to be based on the rapid proliferation
of high-technology methods of fish harvesting and processing
employed by numerous foreign fleets illegally fishing in
their waters.
The importance of marine resources revenues will keep
the fisheries protection a vital national objective. Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru will remain caught in the middle between
accepting and abiding by international law and their
nationalistic desire to reap resources from a huge share of
the sea.
To Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, the fact that it took
three attempts and 14 years to ratify and enact into
international law the UNCLOS III Convention, indicates the
complexities surrounding the question of "Who owns the
oceans?" Coastal states with limited naval forces, fitting
into the definition of the "Small Navy Theory," must
reconsider their priorities regarding naval missions and,
perhaps, to restructure their navies.
Integration of naval policy and fisheries management
can provide alternative methods of conflict resolution among
neighboring states. Intraregional oceanic sovereignty
disputes can be resolved similar to the Beagle channel
conflict between Argentina and Chile. These two Southern
Cone nations agreed to create a binational commission and
Papal mediation to facilitate the economic integration of
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the region, and agreed to abstain from warfare in the area.
Additionally they formalized a treaty for a five-year
suspension of all disputes that might arise along the entire
length of the common national boundary. [Ref. 90 :p. 70]
Alternative methods of conflict resolution show promise
but the best chances for success in avoiding resource
conflicts are to foster regional economic integration (such
as NAFTA and MERCOSUR) , and promote political stability in
South America through the adoption of democratic principles.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
The oceanic disputes between the United States, as a
member of the ^North, ' and the nations of western South
American, all belonging to the *South, ' originate from one
fundamental question: Who owns the ocean?
The answer to this question has great economic and
national security consequences to the United States and most
other coastal nations. From a dollar value alone,
commercial fishery production in the United States adds up
to over $4.1 billion annually [Ref. 91 : INTERNET] . The
economics of ocean fisheries combined with the intangible
national security concept of freedom of the seas present a
unique foreign policy dilemma.
As an authority on the integration between U.S. and
Latin American policy, scholar Virginia M. Hagen clarified
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the dilemma faced by the United States in coping with
international fisheries disputes of the early 1970s:
The power that the United States had was its economic
and military resources which were utilized to compensate
American fishermen' s losses on the one hand and to retaliate
against the offending Latin American states on the other.
However, when this kind of power was wielded to fight
against those national claims partially backed by
"nationalism," it triggered a backlash, for sovereignty and
national dignity were non-negotiable. [Ref. 92 :p. 56]
While the United States had to delicately weigh and
balance each individual component of its integrated national
interests, which included American fishermen's interests,
U.S. foreign policy, security and economic interests in
Latin America, [Ref. 93:p. 22] the Latin American states
fought for their national well-being and dignity with
greater intensity. [Ref. 94 :p. 3288]
An opposing viewpoint on the effect of environmental
degradation applicability to U.S. national security was
presented by professor Marc A. Levy in his essay "Is the
Environment a National Security Issue." Professor Levy
argues that scholars who link environmental degradation to
national security of the United States are primarily
attempting to get more government support for their efforts
to save the environment rather than add to the academic
dialogue of national security. The link between environment
and security, in his view, is often evaluated without regard
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to political causal factors that lead nations into conflict.
[Ref. 95:pp. 35-62] Although Professor Levy faults the
research methods of those who simplistically merge
environment and national security, he provides an
interesting dichotomy of the debate. He states, "...the
direct threat from environmental degradation (involving
environmental refugees, resource wars, and so on) is at once
both the weakest substantive threat to U.S. security and the
strongest intellectual challenge to the field of security
studies. " [Ref. 96:pp. 36-37] Professor Levy presents a
valid point that the environmental-based conflicts do not
pose a direct threat to the national security of the United
States. He does, however, over-simplify and trivialize the
rationale that scholars are using to bring environmental
awareness to the forefront of political debate.
Environmental degradation and closely-related, natural
resource exploitation, continue to be the source of
international relations conflicts.
Perhaps Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, in their
book Power and Interdependence, state the security
challenges for the United States best when they say:
The growth of economic and ecological interdependence
does not provide clear, deterministic guidelines for foreign
policy ... a central issue will be how to exercise
international leadership without the capability for
hegemony. American leadership will encounter the same need
to set a good domestic example, but will find the
application of power more difficult. [Ref. 97:p. 242]
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The difficulties in enforcing maritime claims and the
lack of international institutions capable of managing
transnational environmental problems, leaves the United
States with few viable options. One policy option is to do
all in our power to avert and alleviate international
environmental problems on a unilateral basis. This may
entail use of our trading and financial strength to defend
international standards while displaying a willingness to
join in cooperative agreements. A second approach is
through example, research, information, and persuasion. The
United States can take the lead in financing and supporting
the U.N. agencies charge with the monitoring the oceans and
enforcing international fisheries management directives.
[Ref. 98:p. 141]
The U.S. Commerce Department already has taken concrete
actions to support global and regional fishery management
organizations and to minimize the likelihood of fishery-
based conflicts. Under the late Commerce Secretary Ronald
H. Brown, the Commerce Department implemented the High Seas
Fishing Compliance Act of 1995. This legislation requires
U.S. vessels fishing on the high seas to obtain a permit and
comply with all international conservation and management
measures recognized by the United States. [Ref. 99:INTERNET]
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Through such self-initiated policy, the United States
can counter charges from the developing world that the
United States has recognized and is addressing the problems
of environmental degradation. Similar to encouraging human
rights among its trading partners, the United States
demonstrates its world leadership by establishing such
policy that respects both the sovereign rights of nations
and the * environmental rights' of the world's peoples.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NAVAL POLICY
INSS' Strategic Assessment 1995 concludes that the U.S.
Navy has recognized the emergence of non-traditional naval
missions and has adapted its planning to conform with the
new doctrine of near-shore engagement. Also, the
establishment of the new UNCLOS III ocean regime has
elevated the priority of littoral naval actions and the role
of coastal navies. [Ref. 100: INTERNET]
However, U.S. Navy tactics, techniques, procedures, and
weapons acquisitions must be tailored for this more complex
environment that littoral warfare presents. In
""Forward. . .From the Sea," the latest strategy of the U.S.
Navy, U.S. naval leaders stress that "the most important
role of naval forces in situations short of war is to be
engaged in forward areas, with the objectives of preventing
conflicts and controlling crises." [Ref. 101:pp. 46-49]
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Furthermore, current naval doctrine needs to raise the
importance level of non-traditional missions and place these
NTMs under the framework of Commander, Joint Task
Force (CJTF) principles. As NTMs have become increasingly-
more prevalent than traditional naval missions, doctrine
must adapt and train military officers in the type of
operations in which they will most likely be engaged.
To avoid overstating the threat to U.S. national
security or the U.S. Navy, there will have to be other
critical political and domestic factors present before a
U.S. Navy carrier battlegroup is stationed within
contentious ocean areas with the primary mission of fishery
or EEZ enforcement, i.e. the 1986 freedom-of-navigation
deployment to the Gulf of Sidra.
The U.S. Navy will not likely be deployed to support
directly U.S. fishing interests. The U.S. Coast Guard,
chartered and properly equipped for such a mission, will
remain the responsible force for defending American citizens
engaged in near-shore seaborne commerce. However, the
potential exists for U.S. Navy and the entire U.S.
Intelligence Community' s involvement in larger FBCs that are
mediated under the auspices of the United Nations.
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1. Law Enforcement Component Commander (LAWFOR)
Fisheries patrolling is and has always been an integral
part of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) mission. As such, the
USCG is a natural fit for fulfilling the role of CJTF Law
Enforcement Component Commander (LAWFOR) during a UN-
sponsored FBC peacekeeping operation. However, current
Joint Doctrine does not include the USCG in a standardized
capacity as a component commander and relies on various
agencies to fulfill the LAWFOR role.
This study concludes that what is needed is closer
interaction of the U.S. Coast Guard in the Commander, Joint
Task Force (CJTF) concept and doctrine.
For virtually all non-traditional naval missions e.g.,
FBCs, drug interdiction operations, refugee abatement,
environmental protection and clean-up there exists an
important law enforcement requirement. The USCG is uniquely
qualified to perform such law enforcement actions and, as
such, should be doctrinally designated as the CJTF Law
Enforcement Component Commander (LAWFOR)
.
The explosive growth and success of the CJTF concept
and its proven effectiveness should ensure that the concept
is encompasses any future fishery-based conflict. To that
effect, U.S. joint military publications should be written
for CJTF operations that are legal as opposed to combative
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in nature, i.e. resource conflicts, refugee migration, or
counter-drug smuggling. Current military operational tempo,
systems interoperability structure, and logistics can be
adapted to establish the 11th USCG Headquarters as the Law
Enforcement Component Commander for a fishery-based conflict
operation in the Southeastern Pacific Ocean.
As CJTF LAWFOR, the USCG would have expanded command
and control, communications, computers, and intelligence
(C4I) capabilities and interoperability. Initially, LAWFOR
would have a secret/noforn level Global Command and Control
System (GCCS) and a separate or GCCS-imbedded Joint
Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) . The
communication paths now provided to CJTF Marine Component
Commanders (MARFOR) , Naval Component Commander (NAVFOR)
,
Army Component Commanders (ARFOR) , and Air Component
Commanders (AFFOR) , should be available to LAWFOR.
Annual military exercises, whether computer training
exercises (CPX) or field training exercises (FTX), should
include LAWFOR. USCG Cutters could be designated LAWFOR
command ships and integrated into the same C4I architecture
as other component CJTF commanders
.
USCG Headquarters Pacific and Atlantic possibly could
serve as alternate CJTFs for non-traditional missions that
are primarily of a law enforcement nature. Additionally,
this integration of the USCG as LAWFOR for missions in which
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their unique experience is critical would benefit the other
U.S. military services through a sharing of experiences,
tactics, and knowledge.
Senior U.S. naval leadership, authors of Forward. .. From
the Sea, view non-traditional military missions and littoral
warfare as much more likely to occur than another major land
tank battle, blue water naval engagements, or opposed air-
to-air engagements. To that effect, it will be useful, from
a training and operational standpoint, to integrate the U.S.
Coast Guard into annual CJTF planning and exercises.
2. Implications for the U.S. Naval Intelligence
Community
The U.S. Intelligence Community is properly prepared
for the challenges of non-traditional missions such as
resource-based naval disputes. The Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI) is committed to "devoting significant
resources to formerly non-traditional maritime intelligence
missions" [Ref. 102:p. 15], which will involve in-depth
integration and cooperation with the U.S. Coast Guard. By
providing this service, ONI fulfills one of the primary
functions of the Navy, "to furnish intelligence support for
the Coast Guard." [Ref. 103:p. 1-1-2]
This integration of the U.S. Coast Guard into the
military's C4I architecture will stress the intelligence
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cycle but not cause grave damage. A primary challenge of
intelligence professionals is to ensure the security of
sources and information when operating with law enforcement
components
.
Training of intelligence officers and enlisted
personnel to support fishery-based conflicts or other non-
traditional missions is similar to the CJTF-focused training
that is common throughout the U.S. military. The emergence
of environmental issues as a target for intelligence does
not change the nature of the intelligence field from the
principal tasks of collection, processing, analysis, and
dissemination. 20
Environmental-based conflicts such as FBCs have similar
intelligence requirements as other multinational operations
such as humanitarian relief in Somalia or peace accord
monitoring in Bosnia. To that effect, in any future
fishery-based conflict, intelligence principles must
include
:
Adjust national differences among nations
Establish unity of effort against common threat
Determine and plan intelligence special
arrangements
Exchange and share intelligence across services and
with foreign nationals
Establish complementary intelligence operations
Set up a combined intelligence center
Provide for liaison exchange
20
Environmental monitoring is another new national intelligence requirement according to Vice-
President Al Gore. Vice-President Gore led an effort to make available hundreds of thousands of
reconnaissance satellite images. Some 800,000 declassified images processed by the National
Reconnaissance Office between 1960 and 1972, released in February 1995, are available on the Internet.
Environmental targets are becoming part of the tasking of imagery satellites. But intelligence personnel
who interpret such images may find that expertise in identifying the signatures of Soviet military forces
does not necessarily translate into a facility for addressing environmental issues. INSS Strategic
Assessment 1995.
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These preceding principles must be instituted in
addition to the traditional intelligence principles
stipulated in the Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to
Operations. [Ref. 104 :p. VIII-3]
This is not to say that there are no obstacles or
difficulties for the U.S. Naval Intelligence Community in
supporting non-traditional missions. Several significant
challenges exist. One of the toughest of these challenges
for the intelligence community is to assume responsibility
for intelligence support to these NTMs while maintaining
operational readiness in this Post-Cold War era of dwindling
financial resources. Another complication is that ONI's
commitment to provide intelligence support to U.S. and
coalition operations other than war, has led not only to
greater sharing of intelligence with foreign governments but
also to increased reliance on foreign expertise. This
commitment, however necessary, has led to gargantuan
problems of interpreting foreign languages, maintaining
sufficient regional expertise, and ensuring proper security
classifications. In response, the Navy's newly-created
Foreign Area Officer program should, over time, alleviate
many of these obstructions to efficient and effective
intelligence flow.
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Intelligence of the ocean areas, a traditional venue of
the Naval Intelligence Community, will become more critical
because in the not-to-distant future, like all the terra-
firma on the planet, all the water of the Earth will be
^owned.' Tragically, the seven seas eventually will be
considered sovereign territory of national or supranational
entities and arbitrary boundary lines in the ocean will
mimic the arbitrary boundary lines drawn on land, thus
guaranteeing future conflicts at sea.
E. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
Scholarly literature on maritime issues is
overwhelmingly skewed towards the analysis of the large,
global navies of the industrialized nations. Traditional
naval missions such as power projection, strike warfare, and
high seas warfare dominate the discussion of naval analysts.
With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War, lesser priority naval missions should be investigated
in the context of how these non-traditional missions will
effect North-South international relations.
Non-traditional missions must be analyzed more than
just in terms of conducting amphibious operations or
overland airstrikes, such as the operations in Somalia and
Bosnia, respectively. Further research is needed on how
NTMs will affect the operations of the U.S. Navy, U.S..
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Coast Guard, and the U.S. Intelligence Community in these
times of dwindling defense budgets.
Naval enforcement missions must no longer be researched
as independent, grand, Mahanian21 events but instead,
evaluated in the greater sphere of the effect on domestic
politics, national policy-making, and global economic
influence
.
There is currently a significant gap in the research
devoted to the national security implications of
environmental crises. After reviewing a wide swath of
academic sources, it appears much of the work is devoted to
the historical, economic, and scientific aspects of the
global environment. Marine biologists are correctly moving
forward with proposed solutions to oceanic environmental
degradation while environmentalists are active in studying
and predicting the consequences of over-exploitation of the
Earth's resources. However, social scientists need to apply
their international relations and conflict causation
theories towards determining how governments and
institutions will and should react to future oceanic
sovereignty challenges.
21
In the late 1800s, naval theorist Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan taught and wrote of a new naval theory
based on two precepts: 1) national prosperity and destiny were based on mercantilistic imperialism and 2)
a powerful sea-going navy was necessary to protct overseas colonies and the merchant marine fleet. See
the discussion in Armed Forces Staff College, AFSC Pub 2: Service Warfighting Philosophy and




FUTURE FISHERY-BASED CONFLICT SCENARIO
1) El Nino phenomena occurs in two consecutive years.
Major fishing crisis ensures for Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.
2) Consortium of CEP government agencies act collectively
to protect sovereign ocean resources rights.
3) CEP heads-of-state, bowing to internal political
pressures, dispatch CEP naval vessels to expel foreign
commercial fishing fleets from CEP' s claim 200 run
territorial waters. U.S., Japanese, Taiwanese, and Russian
commercial fishing fleets present in CEP-claimed waters.
4) After expulsion by CEP naval units, commercial fishermen
protest to respective governments.
5) Fiery San Diego congressman appeals to U.S. House of
Representatives to allot funds for naval missions in support
of U.S. maritime (fishing) interests.
6) CEP consortium appeals to UN citing tacit Group 77
approval and the provisions of the 1952 Declaration of
Santiago. CEP evokes this declaration to avoid suffering
the same economic devastation as that which struck Peru in
the early 1970s and Canada in the 1990s. Chile, Ecuador,
and Peru deploy naval units to defend their national
maritime claims and top protect migratory fisheries outside
the 200nm boundary.
7) As tensions increase, the Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI) and the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific (JICPAC)
are tasked to increase collection, processing, analysis, and
dissemination in the area. Primary intelligence
requirements are the location, capability, and activity of
fishing vessels and surface combatants.
8) U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Fleet units and U.S. Navy's 3rd
Fleet Task Force sent to CEP waters to show resolve and
protect U.S. commercial interest. Additional ocean
surveillance conducted by U.S. west coast-based P-3 Orion
aircraft.
9) Russia sends refurbished guided missile destroyer and
escort ships to show resolve and to protect factory fishing
ship operating off Peruvian coast.
Ill
10) Japan deploys a complement of 3 surface combatants as
their contribution to a coalition naval force.
11) Diplomatic negotiation in Washington, D.C. lead to a
compromise between CEP and the United States on access to
fishing grounds and maximum allowable fish catch sizes.
12) UN-sponsored peacekeeping operation Joint Task Force
established in Santiago, Chile. U.S. 3rd Fleet assigned as
Naval Forces Component Commander (NAVFOR) and U.S. Coast
Guard 11th District assigned as Law Enforcement Component
Commander (LAWFOR)
.
13) USN and CEP naval units avoid direct confrontation.
14) Diplomatic stalemate between CEP and Russian delegation
in Washington, D.C.




SUMMARY OF CURRENT FISHERY-BASED CONFLICTS
[Ref. 110: INTERNET]
Dec 1996 British and French fishermen fight over rich
fishing grounds around the Channel Islands.
French Coast Guard vessel and helicopter protects
seven French fishing boats. {Press Association
Limited, 12 December 1996) .
Dec 1996 Japan and China held two days of talks on
bilateral fishing matters at the foreign Ministry
in Tokyo. Officials met to discuss a new
fisheries agreement, following Japan's
ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and
Japan's establishment of a 200-mile exclusive
economic zone. {Kyodo News International
,
9 December 1996)
Dec 1996 China has reportedly decided to establish a
200, 000-strong para-military "maritime cruise
unit" to safeguard and manage areas under its
jurisdiction and guard against any infringement
upon its rights and interests. The new unit
will use advanced technology, including marine
surveillance aircraft, radars, satellite remote
sensing equipment, and Zhi-9 helicopters. {BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 December 1996)
Nov 1996 The Honduran government filed an official protest
with Managua after two fishing boats were arrested
by Nicaraguan naval vessels in disputed Caribbean
waters. Presidents Carlos Roberto Reina and
Violeta Chamorro to meet to discuss the formal
demarcation of the maritime frontier. {Latin
American Weekly Report, 28 November 1996)
Oct 1996 Russian Coast Guard seized a Japanese fishing boat
with five men aboard on 12 October 1996 for
alleged poaching in Russian-held waters off
Japan's northernmost main island of Hokkaido. The
Japanese Foreign Ministry has protested the
seizure, the first in the disputed waters since
September 1995. {Kyodo News Service,
14 October 1996)
113
Oct 1996 Russian fishermen may resort to force to stop
Icelandic fishing trawlers depleting stocks of cod
in the Barents Sea, warned the deputy head of
Russia's State Fisheries Committee. Russian
fishermen were "considering seeking support from
Russia's armed forces ministries" to stop
Icelandic trawlers illegally catching cod in the
Barents Sea. {Agence France Presse,
12 October 1996)
Oct 1996 The United Kingdom and its European partners are
headed for a showdown over fishing. The issue in
contention is "quota-hopping"- the practice in
which foreign fishermen buy British licenses. UK
fishermen are outraged by the sight of Spanish
boats heading off to Spanish ports with fish
caught against British quotas. (Financial Times,
16 October 1996)
Aug 1996 Vietnam reported that useful talks had been held
with China on the demarcation of the Gulf of
Tonkin, which the two countries share. The area
has been a source of disputes over fishing rights
and oil exploration. {Reuters, 8 August 1996)
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APPENDIX C
TERRITORIAL DECLARATIONS OF WESTERN HEMISPHERIC STATES
[Ref. lll:pp. 183-193]
United States of America: Presidential Proclamation,
28 Sep 45:
Having concern for the urgency of conserving and
prudently utilizing its natural resources, the Government of
the United States regards the natural resources of the
subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the
high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States
as appertaining to the United States, subject to its
jurisdiction and control.
Harry S. Truman
United Mexican States: Presidential Declaration, 29
Oct 45 {El Universal, Mexico City, 30 October 1945, pp. 1,
17.)
For these reasons, the Government of the Republic
claims the whole continental shelf adjacent to its coasts
and all and every one of the natural riches, known or still
to be discovered, which are found in it, and will proceed to
supervise, utilize and control the zones of fishing
protection which are necessary for the conservation of this
source of well-being.
Mexico, D.F., 29 October 1945.
The President of the Republic,
Manuel Avila Camacho
Panama: Constitution, 1 Mar 46 (Excerpt)
4th. The air space and continental shelf corresponding to
the national territory.
Argentine Republic: Presidential Decree, 11 Oct 46
In the international sphere conditional recognition is
accorded to the right of every nation to consider as
national territory the entire extent of its epicontinental
sea and of the adjacent continental shelf;
Article 1. It is hereby declared that the Argentine
Epicontinental Sea and Continental Shelf are subject to the
sovereign power of the Nation:
Chile: Presidential Declaration 25 Jun 47
The Government of Chile confirms and proclaims the
national sovereignty over the whole continental shelf
adjacent to the continental and insular coasts of the
national territory whatever its depth may be, claiming,
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consequently, all the natural riches which exist on, in, or
under said shelf, know or to be discovered.
Gabriel Gonzales Videla,
President of the Republic
Peru: Presidential Decree, 1 Aug 47
That it is equally necessary that the State protect,
conserve, and regulate the use of fishing resources and
other natural wealth which is found in the epicontinental
waters which cover the submarine platform and in the
continental seas adjacent to it, in order that this wealth,
essential to the national life, shall be exploited now and
in the future in such a way that no detriment is caused to
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